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(3) Approval or disapproval and coordination of pursuit tactics.

(4) Approval or disapproval to leave jurisdiction to continue pursuit.

(5) Approval or disapproval of the use of vehicle disabling devices, such as spikes, to bring the pursuant vehicle to a halt.

(6) The Watch Commander shall prepare a comprehensive report of the pursuit and attach it as a supplement to the IR.

d. The Watch Commander may approve and assign additional backup vehicles to assist the primary and backup pursuit vehicle based on an analysis of:

(1) The nature of the offense for which the pursuit was initiated.

(2) The number of suspects and any known propensity for violence.

(3) The number of MPs/police officers in the pursuit vehicles.

(4) Any damage or injuries to the assigned primary and backup vehicle or MPs/police officers.

(5) The number of MPs/police officers necessary to make an apprehension or detention at the conclusion of the pursuit.

(6) Any other clear and articulable facts that would warrant the increased hazards caused by numerous pursuit vehicles.

#### 6. Traffic Regulations During Pursuit

a. Each unit authorized to engage in vehicular pursuit shall be required to activate headlights and all emergency vehicle equipment prior to beginning pursuit.

b. MPs/police officers engaged in pursuit shall, at all times, drive in a manner exercising reasonable care for the safety of themselves and all other persons and property within the pursuit area.

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c. MPs/police officers are permitted to suspend conformance with normal traffic regulations during pursuit as long as reasonable care is used, and the maneuver is reasonably necessary to maintain contact or gain control of the suspect.

#### 7. Pursuit Tactics

a. Unless expressly authorized by a Watch Commander, pursuit shall be limited to the assigned primary and one backup vehicle. MPs/police officers are not otherwise permitted to join the pursuit team or follow the pursuit on parallel streets.

b. MPs/police officers may not intentionally use their vehicles to bump or ram the suspect's vehicle off the road or use vehicles as road blocks in order to force a vehicle to stop.

c. All intervention tactics short of deadly force such as spike strips, low speed tactical intervention techniques, and low speed channeling (with appropriate advance warning) should be used when it is possible to do so in safety and when the MPs/police officers utilizing them have received appropriate training in their use.

d. Decisions to discharge firearms at or from a moving vehicle, shall be governed by chapter 6, use of force, and reference (ac). The use of firearms to disable a pursued vehicle is not generally an effective tactic and involves all the dangers associated with discharging firearms. MPs/police officers should not utilize firearms during a pursuit unless the conditions and circumstances dictate that such that deadly force would be authorized under chapter 6, use of force, and reference (ac).

e. Once the pursued vehicle is stopped, MPs/police officers shall utilize appropriate safety tactics and shall be aware of the necessity to utilize only reasonable and necessary force to take suspects into custody.

#### 8. Termination of Pursuit

a. A decision to terminate pursuit may be the most rational means of preserving the lives and property of both the public and the MPs/police officers and suspects engaged in pursuit. Pursuits may be terminated by the pursuing MP/police officer, on order of the Watch Commander, Operations Chief, Operations Officer, Deputy PM/PC, Provost Sergeant or PM/PC.

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b. Pursuit shall be immediately terminated in any of the following circumstances:

(1) Weather or traffic conditions substantially increase the danger of pursuit beyond the worth of apprehending the suspect.

(2) The distance between the pursuit and fleeing vehicles is so great that further pursuit is futile.

(3) The danger posed by continued pursuit to the public, MPs/police officers, or the suspect is greater than the value of apprehending the suspect(s).

(4) The pursuing MP/police officer shall relay this information to the Dispatch/ Communications Center along with any further information which may assist in an apprehension or detention at a later date.

9. Loss of Pursued Vehicle. When the pursued vehicle is lost, the primary unit should broadcast pertinent information to assist other units in locating suspects. The primary unit will be responsible for coordinating any further search, in coordination with the Watch Commander, for either the pursued vehicle or suspects fleeing on foot (for more information on foot pursuits, refer to section 9800).

10. Inter-Jurisdictional Pursuits

a. Out of Jurisdiction

(1) When it is apparent that a pursuit is likely to leave the installation, the pursuing MP/police officer must receive permission from the Watch Commander to continue the pursuit. Off installation pursuits will only be authorized in exigent circumstances, and are subject to the rules and restrictions articulated in MOUs/MOAs with local civilian agencies. For more information, see section 2100, and seek guidance from the installation SJA via the chain of command. At the time of the incident, the Watch Commander may contact the installation SAUSA to seek guidance prior to authorizing pursuit off the installation. The Watch Commander will take into consideration distance traveled, unfamiliarity with the area, and other pertinent facts in determining whether to authorize the pursuit off the installation. If approved, the Watch Commander will instruct the Dispatch/Communications Center to

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advise jurisdictional entities of the pursuit, the direction of travel, vehicle description, and the reason for the pursuit.

(2) The primary and secondary units originally involved will discontinue the pursuit when advised that another agency has assumed the pursuit and military law enforcement assistance is no longer needed. Upon discontinuing the pursuit, the primary unit may proceed, in a non-law enforcement capacity, upon request of the civilian agency to the termination point to provide a statement to the arresting officer (provisions of reference (i) apply, see sections 2000 and 2100). Such requests for statements will be authorized by the Watch Commander, in consultation with the PMO/MCPD chain of command and installation SAUSA.

b. In to Jurisdiction

(1) Applicable to installations that include public access roads or non-exclusive legislative jurisdiction areas accessible to the general public without entry through access control points, MPs/police officers will not participate as a pursuit vehicle in any pursuit by another agency entering into the installation in these non-exclusive areas, without the approval of the Watch Commander. The Watch Commander, prior to giving approval, must have adequate information to determine that the pursuit is justified based on the criteria as set forth in this section.

(2) Notification of a pursuit in progress should not be construed as a request to join the pursuit. Requests to or from another agency to assume a pursuit should be specific. Whether the Watch Commander authorizes participation in the pursuit or not, the other agency will be allowed to continue their pursuit in an unimpeded manner within concurrent and proprietary areas.

11. Pursuit Review. A pursuit review will be conducted conforming with the processes for administrative investigations outlined in reference (bd). LE executives at each installation are responsible for compliance with the investigative policies, and reporting requirements outlined therein, and in other applicable orders, including, but not limited to, Serious Incident Reporting procedures as outlined in reference (be).

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Section 10500 - Use of Emergency Vehicles  
and Unmarked Patrol Vehicles

10501. Purpose. This section establishes PMO/MCPD guidelines for the use of emergency vehicles in patrol functions.

10502. Policy.

1. Emergency vehicles shall be distinctly marked per section 5500. Criminal investigations, low profile and administrative vehicles need not be marked. Emergency vehicle response will be authorized only in those situations set forth in this section and only when the safety of everyone involved has been considered.

2. Emergency vehicle response is necessary in two types of situations:

a. When there is a need to have MPs/police officers at the scene of a serious incident faster than they could arrive without emergency procedures.

b. When it is necessary to pursue an individual suspected of violating the law.

10503. Definitions. Emergency response is the rapid movement of police vehicles in reaction to a serious incident. Emergency vehicle response generally involves the following factors:

1. The use of flashing or steady burning warning lights on the authorized emergency vehicle (AEV). Four-way emergency flashers will not be used except as intended by the manufacturer.

2. The use of an audible siren on the AEV.

3. Operation of the AEV in excess of posted speed limits.

4. Violation of certain traffic regulations by the AEV.

10504. Procedures

1. Emergency Situations. The following are considered to be emergency situations during which MPs/police officers may be authorized emergency vehicle response. MPs/police officers shall request permission from the Dispatch/Communications Center unless the exigent circumstances require immediate emergency response.

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- a. Incidents of a felonious nature and possibly life-threatening.
- b. "Military police/police officer needs help" calls where MPs/police officers are in immediate danger.
- c. Calls of "shot fired, man with a gun, person screaming," or other trouble calls where there is a reasonable belief that life is in danger.
- d. When responding to the scene of a major crime or incident when it is believed that normal response would substantially jeopardize law enforcement or investigative action.
- e. When responding to a traffic accident where injuries have been reported.
- f. When responding to a traffic accident where the extent of injuries is unknown, but there is a reasonable belief that persons could be injured.
- g. When responding to other accidents; i.e., industrial, aircraft, under conditions similar to subparagraphs e and f above.
- h. When directed to establish roadblocks in connection with emergency aircraft landings and other serious incidents.
- i. When responding to medical emergencies prior to the arrival of medical personnel.
- j. When responding to fires or other emergencies prior to the arrival of Fire Department personnel.
- k. When emergency law enforcement response is requested by Fire Department or medical personnel.
- l. When transporting injured persons in the absence of medical assistance.
- m. When necessary to apprehend person(s) suspected of a felony.
- n. When in pursuit of a vehicle under the conditions detailed in section 10400.

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o. During protective service details when it is necessary to transport the protected person rapidly for safety.

p. During other situations when, in the judgment of police supervisors, such response is justified.

2. Use of Emergency Vehicle Equipment. The emergency equipment installed on AEVs may be used in certain non-emergency situations. Examples are:

a. The use of warning lights, blue/red lights and siren to stop a traffic violator and issue a violation notice.

b. The use of the vehicle's warning lights, blue/red lights for traffic control or as a hazard warning for traffic stops, accidents, construction, disabled vehicles, etc.

c. The use of the vehicle's warning lights, blue/red lights for funeral escorts, hazardous material escorts, or for access to aircraft flight lines.

3. Emergency escorts are prohibited. The use of an AEV to lead a non-emergency vehicle on the roadway under emergency conditions is prohibited. This situation often occurs when a motorist is transporting a sick or injured person and seeks assistance. MPs/police officers have the choice of: calling for medical assistance at the scene, transporting the person in the AEV, or providing a non-emergency escort.

4. On duty MPs/police officer may use emergency vehicles for subsistence. Sometimes MPs/police officers in a duty status need to stop at dining facilities, the installation Marine Corps Exchange, 7-day stores, etc. PMs/CPs shall establish in writing those areas where on-duty MPs/police officers may make an expedient stop for this purpose.

5. Persons initiating the emergency movement of any AEV will immediately broadcast that fact, as soon as possible, and indicate the location and direction of travel.

6. The Watch Commander or the Dispatch/Communications Center may alter the emergency response of a patrol unit. Some of the factors which should be considered in making this decision are:

a. Will an emergency response significantly expedite the patrol unit's response time?

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b. Will an emergency response alleviate a hazard to victim(s) at the scene of an incident?

c. What is the likelihood that an emergency response will precipitate a hostage situation or other hazardous act(s) by the suspect(s) (e.g., robbery in progress)?

7. Responding patrolman may request the initiation or discontinuance of an emergency response to the Watch Commander or Dispatch/Communications Center if deemed necessary and, if no reply is received from a supervisor, may alter the response, taking into account the factors specified above.

#### 8. Violations of Traffic Laws

a. Personnel operating emergency vehicles must do so at a safe speed. A safe speed is the speed at which the driver of an AEV can bring the vehicle to a stop, avoiding a collision with any vehicle or pedestrian who may fail to heed the emergency warning devices.

b. MPs/police officers may be required to violate traffic regulations while operating an AEV. Proceeding through red lights, stop signs, and uncontrolled intersections must be accomplished with utmost caution. AEV operators may also be required to exceed the posted speed limits, provided that they do not exceed the safe operating speed.

c. Even though there are situations in which MPs/police officers may exceed the posted speed limit, good judgment and operation of vehicles in a manner appropriate for existing conditions is required. MPs/police officers are responsible for any negligent or reckless operation of emergency vehicles.

d. High speed pursuits are addressed in section 10400.

#### 9. Road Block Procedures

a. The use of "moving/rolling" road blocks is prohibited.

b. The use of road blocks at entry and exit points of an installation should only be used when the fleeing vehicle could cause serious harm to the public. Ramming a suspect vehicle by police vehicles is prohibited.

c. Any road blocks, particularly those in congested areas such as gates, should leave an escape route.



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- d. The use of tire flattening devices is authorized.

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Section 10600 - Vehicle Inspections  
(Random Vehicle Inspections, Command Authorized Vehicle  
Inspections)

10601. Purpose. This section establishes guidelines and limitations concerning vehicle inspections aboard Marine Corps installations.

10602. Policy

1. Command authorized vehicle inspections are an effective tool for the installation commander to deter the theft of government property, the introduction of contraband onto the installation, and to detect illegal activity. When authorized, inspections will be conducted in accordance with reference (d) and local policies. Inspections may be held anywhere aboard the installation as approved by the installation commander. Inspections must:

a. Be scheduled in advance and approved by the installation commander.

b. Be coordinated with the installation SJA to ensure strict compliance with a structured random inspection pattern.

2. To enhance the overall effectiveness of a given FPCON, installation commanders develop and implement random antiterrorism measures (RAM) programs, including random vehicle inspections, as an integral part of their AT program. RAM programs offer commanders an alternative to full implementation of higher FPCON measures when terrorist threat estimates suggest that lower FPCONs may not be adequate in view of the risk, vulnerability, and criticality of DOD assets at the installation. Advantages of implementing RAMs include, but are not limited to:

a. Variation in security routines makes it more difficult for terrorists to target important assets, build detailed descriptions of significant routines, or predict activities by a specific asset or within a targeted facility or installation.

b. Increased AT awareness for DOD personnel, their dependents, visitors, and neighbors.

c. Increased alertness among law enforcement, security, and base or facility personnel.

d. Reduced adverse operational effects and unplanned economic costs when enhanced AT measures must be maintained for extended periods.

10603. Definitions

1. Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMs). RAMs are used to randomly implement measures from higher FPCONs, command developed measures, or locally developed site-specific measures to supplement or enhance security measures or FPCONs already in place, in order to alter the installation or facility security signature by introducing uncertainty for planners and organizers of terrorist attacks. For installations, random vehicle inspections are a type of RAM conducted at installation exterior entry/exit gates. Commercial vehicle inspections may also be part of RAM when not required to be implemented by FPCON measure.

2. Command Authorized Vehicle Inspections. Command authorized vehicle inspections are vehicle inspections specifically authorized in writing by the installation commander. These inspections may be conducted at any location on the installation.

10604. Procedures

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (ai) and (w), the PM/PC shall use vehicle inspections (command authorized and RAM) to enhance the safety and security of the installation. These inspections shall be coordinated with the installation SJA, installation Antiterrorism Officer and approved by the installation commander. These vehicle inspections should include commercial vehicles as well, either as part of other vehicle inspections or separately.

2. Operations Officers/Deputy Chiefs of Police for Operations shall assign personnel and assets to conduct random vehicle inspections at times/dates as directed and per this section.

3. Inspection teams shall:

a. Include MWDs/CPWDs when available. Prior to assignment, MWD/CPWD teams will be trained to inspect all types and sizes of vehicles. Ensure the proper conduct of vehicle inspections and proper completion of any citations, reports or apprehensions/detentions resulting from those inspections.

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b. Report to the designated inspection location and prepare for the inspection prior to the designated inspection time.

c. Establish cone patterns depending upon the location of the inspection. Cones should be set up to properly funnel traffic and provide for the safety of the inspection personnel and motorists.

d. When the inspection location is at a gate, mount "Identification Check In Progress" signs on the provided posts. Ensure drivers can see the signs whether inbound or outbound.

e. Upon commencing the inspection, direct enough cars to fill each stall and every stall that becomes available thereafter until the inspection ends or as directed.

f. Greet drivers and notify them of the installation commander's administrative vehicle inspection. Ask drivers to state their name, rank (if applicable), unit (address, if civilian), and destination. Observe driver's speech, movements and actions, noting any indicators of alcohol or other drug impairment.

g. Instruct drivers to turn off engine and produce a valid driver's license, valid state registration, proof of insurance, and safety inspection, if required. Review the paperwork for validity and accuracy. If an owner recently purchased the vehicle from a second party and has not yet registered the vehicle, check the title for proper transfer of ownership. While waiting for the required documents, visually scan the exterior and interior of the vehicle for contraband or safety violations (e.g. failure to wear a safety belt).

h. Instruct drivers and all passengers to exit the vehicle. Have a MWD/CPWD team search the vehicle. If the MWD/CPWD alerts, take appropriate actions. If available, use technology to determine what kind of narcotic has been found, and randomly use the technology on likely locations narcotics may be found.

i. Conduct a physical inspection of the vehicle interior, beginning on the passenger's side and moving clockwise. Inspect all items within the passenger compartment and trunk, including bags, boxes and other containers.

j. After completing the physical inspection, instruct the driver to assist with a safety equipment inspection by demonstrating the operability of the vehicle's headlights,

taillights, brake lights, turn signals, and horn. Document discrepancies on a DD Form 1408 Armed Forces Traffic Ticket for military/military affiliated personnel.

k. The inspection team scribe shall document the time of inspection, vehicle description and registration number, driver's name, social security number, and any noted discrepancies.

l. After completing the safety inspection, permit passengers to re-enter the vehicle and release the driver without further delay. Assist the driver to safely exit the inspection stall.

m. Call the Operations Chief/Assistant Operations Officer and/or Operations Officer as directed for any incidents involving field grade officers and E-8s or above.

n. Ensure the Dispatch/Communications Center has the following information: time, date, MWD/CPWD team, number of vehicles inspected and discrepancies in order to make the appropriate journal entry:

o. If an individual stopped during the course of the inspection is found to be in possession of classified military information (CMI), the following steps should be taken:

(1) Ensure the CMI is double-wrapped when being transported outside the command. A locked briefcase may serve as the outer cover.

(2) Ensure the CMI has not been opened en-route to the final destination and that the courier is taking the most direct route.

(3) Ensure personnel transporting CMI are in possession of a valid Courier Card (DD Form 2501) and hold a security clearance that is equal to or exceeds the classification of the material escorted (although there is no practical method to verify security clearances on-scene, the individual should still be queried as to the level of security clearance they hold).

(4) Personnel not in compliance with the above provisions are in violation of security regulations. Immediately secure the classified material and call the installation security manager. If there is inadvertent disclosure of CMI during the course of inspecting the vehicle or confiscating the material, the individual must present

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themselves to the installation Security Manager's Office at the earliest opportunity for debriefing.

4. Watch Commanders or patrol supervisors shall supervise the performance and conduct of vehicle inspection teams during their watch.

5. On-duty gate sentries, when a command authorized inspection occurs at a gate, shall:

a. Require drivers of vehicles not inspected to produce a valid Armed Forces Identification (AFID) or United States Uniform Services Identification and Privilege card, or picture identification if nonmilitary, and state their name, rank (if applicable), social security number, unit (or address, if civilian), and destination. Match the driver's response against the AFID/United States Uniform Services Identification and Privilege card produced. Also observe the driver's speech, movements and actions, noting any indicators of alcohol or drug impairment.

b. Take the following action for suspected driving under the influence of alcohol or drug incidents:

(1) Apprehend and process all military/military-affiliated drivers that appear intoxicated per policy. Detain civilian drivers with no military affiliation and process per policy.

(2) Transport all suspects to PMO/MCPD and process them appropriately.

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## Section 10700 - Comprehensive Roadside Safety Checkpoints

10701. Purpose. This section provides PMO/MCPD operational guidelines for conducting comprehensive roadside safety checkpoints (CRSC).

10702. Policy

1. It is Marine Corps policy to promote safety for motorists using installation roadways and to provide a deterrent for those who violate federal laws, installation regulations, and state laws. The purpose of a CRSC is the deterrence of certain offenses, such as driving under the influence, and the promotion of certain safety acts, like the wearing of safety belts. The intent of a checkpoint is to increase motorists' perceived risk of detection and apprehension/ detention, to affect a greater public awareness of the problems that are targeted by the checkpoints, and to encourage compliance with regulations.

2. Any procedure used by a PMO/MCPD in conducting comprehensive CRSCs should be measured against the following considerations and priorities:

- a. Enhancement of MP/police officer and motorist safety.
- b. Avoidance of undue inconvenience to the public.
- c. The deterrent effect created by the roadside safety check.

10703. Procedures

1. PMs/CPs shall:

- a. Approve all CRSC plans.
- b. Ensure that installation SJAs, Safety Offices, and installation commanders are consulted regarding the planned operations for conducting CRSCs.

2. Operations Officers/Deputy Chiefs of Police for Operations are responsible for designating a MP/police officer to serve as the checkpoint officer in charge (OIC), ensuring completion of planning and ensuring that the checkpoint is conducted in accordance with this section.

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3. The checkpoint OIC shall be responsible for preparing the CRSC plan and conducting the operations of the checkpoint.

4. The Support Services Officer will coordinate with the installation Public Affairs Office for appropriate coverage of the CRSC.

5. Selection of a Location for a CRSC

a. The PM/PC or his/her designee will approve the location and time of the CRSC, and if appropriate, submit to the installation commander for approval. The time of a CRSC shall not normally interfere with commuter rush hour traffic.

b. The location to be used as a CRSC site will meet the following minimum requirements:

(1) The frequency of traffic violations or traffic crashes should be a primary consideration in determining the general location of the checkpoint.

(2) Adequate safety and visibility for oncoming motorists.

(3) Ample room for police and subject vehicles.

(4) Availability of a secondary screening area.

(5) Freedom from business and residential driveways, alleys and intersecting streets or highways that may be impacted by the operation.

(6) Roadway and parking areas should be well-drained.

(7) Freedom from obvious hazards on the roadway.

(8) Adequate advance warning signs and sufficient lighting to ensure motorist and member safety.

6. The CRSC plan shall be completed and submitted to the PM/PC prior to the start of the CRSC.

a. At a minimum, the plan will contain the following:

(1) Purpose.

(2) Objectives.



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(3) Operational time-line.

(4) Manpower requirement, including specific assignments and billet descriptions.

(5) Equipment list.

(6) Layout/diagram of site.

b. Each CRSC plan will specify the techniques to be used (e.g., seatbelt inspection, vehicle equipment inspection, sobriety inspection, motorist insurance inspection or a combination thereof). The purpose and procedures of the safety check will be uniformly applied during the operation.

c. MPs/police officers assigned to CRSCs do not have the authority to change the plan after approval by the PM/PC. MP/police officer discretion will not be used in adjusting the plan, with the exception of the OIC, who will document the reason(s) for any adjustments.

#### 7. General CRSC Procedures

a. Close cooperation between CRSC personnel and the Dispatch/Communications Center is necessary to assure rapid reply in those cases where an inquiry is considered necessary.

b. The selection of vehicles to be stopped (for example, every vehicle, a vehicle for each empty space, every fifth, tenth or fifteenth vehicle) will be prescribed and uniformly applied during the operation.

c. At installation gates only, a driver's effort to avoid a checkpoint is not sufficient to justify the stopping of a vehicle, consequently probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or other traffic related violations must occur in order to warrant the stopping of a vehicle. For checkpoints inside installations, MPs/police officers may stop a vehicle that is avoiding a checkpoint.

d. The CRSC OIC and all other personnel and equipment will be in the proper place and ready to proceed before the first subject vehicle is stopped.

8. Traffic Direction. At the scene of a CRSC, traffic will be directed by using the following procedures:

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a. Barricade and sign placement and any necessary lane closures are to be in accordance with state, federal, local procedures and section 10100.

b. CRSCs will be conducted only when manpower is available to reasonably ensure efficient operation with MP/police officer and motorist safety in mind.

c. MPs/police officers and official vehicles will be in sufficient quantity and visibility to show the presence. The MCPV is ideal for use in CRSCs.

9. The CRSC OIC will be present on the scene to supervise operations. Should it be necessary for the CRSC OIC to leave the scene, he/she should obtain approval first, and if allowed to depart, assign another OIC.

10. It is important for MPs/police officers conducting the CRSC to be extremely courteous to motorists to minimize any inconvenience or displeasure that they may experience from this operation.

11. Inspection Procedures. The inspection procedure will be thorough but with a minimum delay to motorists:

a. Unless the driver's license or AFID/United States Uniform Services Identification and Privilege card check is a designated part of the safety check procedure, MPs/police officers should not request to see them. However, if the driver offers a license or AFID/United States Uniform Services Identification and Privilege card to a MP/police officer it may be reviewed. A driver's license that appears valid on its face will be considered as prima facie proof that the driver is in compliance with the driver licensing laws.

b. If the driver is also the owner or registrant of the vehicle, as shown by a comparison of the vehicle registration certificate with the operator's license, the MP/police officer may require the driver to display proof-of-insurance that shall include a proof-of-insurance card, a valid insurance policy, insurance policy binder or a certificate of insurance (proof-of-self insurance).

c. License plates will be inspected to determine whether they are current.

d. A check of NCIC and DONCJIS will not be made unless the MP/police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a violation has been or is being committed.

e. If the MP/police officer has at least reasonable suspicion that a driver is in violation of the law/regulations, the driver will be directed to a secondary screening area and appropriate enforcement action will be taken (unless the person is believed to be driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs when they will be processed without moving the vehicle). Vehicle registration and proof of insurance shall be required.

f. If a MP/police officer detects a violation or acquires probable cause to believe an offense has been committed, or observes contraband in plain sight, appropriate enforcement action will be taken.

g. MPs/police officers will listen for speech difficulties and look for any other signs that might indicate driver impairment, such as bloodshot eyes, the odor of alcoholic beverages or illicit drugs, and lack of coordination.

h. MPs/police officers should observe the vehicle for any equipment violations.

i. Traffic shall not be allowed to accumulate. If traffic congestion occurs and a delay to motorists results, vehicles should be allowed to proceed through without inspection until the congestion is cleared. All traffic congestion that results in allowing vehicles to proceed without checking shall be documented.

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## Section 10800 - Mobile Command Post Vehicles

10801. Purpose. This section establishes guidelines for the operation of Mobile Command Post Vehicles (MCPV).

10802. Policy. Per the provisions of the NRP and NIMS (see section 3000), installation commanders require a mobile critical incident command and control capability that allows for maximum coordination with other emergency response agencies, both on and off installations, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. MCPVs are assigned to PMOs/MCPDs.

### 10803. Procedures

1. The primary roles of the MCPV are law enforcement (LE) and/or emergency response coordination. The MCPV provides the installation commander, PM/PC and other designated emergency services or law enforcement personnel operating on the commander's behalf with a mobile command center that offers the following capabilities:

a. On-scene command and control facility with an independent communication center separate from daily emergency radio traffic.

b. Area to facilitate interview and interrogations.

c. Area to provide command briefs to disseminate information.

d. A command post which may be positioned in close proximity to an incident or event.

2. Special Events Coordination. In addition to the above core roles, the MCPV provides the installation commander with a mobile command center for major installation events (such as air shows, rodeos, concerts, Independence Day events, sporting events, etc.) with a centralized and highly visible LE vehicle with an on-board public address system to coordinate recovery of lost children/family members.

### 3. Additional Uses

a. Impaired driving enforcement and "Safe & Sober" checkpoints. The MCPV is an additional tool that may be used by the PM/PC to reduce alcohol related automobile incidents by providing a visible deterrent and promoting awareness and strict

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enforcement of impaired driving regulations. The MCPV provides law enforcement personnel with a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) approved breath testing device (BTD) for on-scene processing of impaired subjects.

b. Provides limited mobile dispatch capabilities. In the event of catastrophic failure of the primary Dispatch/Communications Center, the MCPV may be used as a mobile and temporary dispatch facility until primary dispatch capabilities are restored.

c. MCPV is an additional asset that can be utilized to support "drill scenarios" in support of Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (ATFP) or NIMS. This support can provide a capability in integration into Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) and mass casualty drills. Refer to section 3000 for additional information in support of NIMS.

#### 4. Discouraged Uses

a. The MCPV should not be used as a SRT vehicle.

b. The MCPV is designed solely as a command post vehicle and unauthorized application and use for things like storage is discouraged.

5. Registration/Licensing. All operators of the MCPV must meet federal, state, local, and installation registration and operator requirements prior to operating the MCPV on public or installation roadways.

6. Vehicle Characteristics, Capabilities, and Features. In general, the MCPV is equipped with the following:

a. Exterior halogen lighting.

b. 25 foot heavy-duty non-locking interior telescoping pneumatic mast with three cameras (pan, tilt, zoom, outdoor types).

c. Charge Coupled Device or Color-Capture Device (CCD) ultra-high performance color video camera.

d. Narrow beam, 830-nanometer illuminator.

e. Infrared illuminator.

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f. One paging amplifier with four roof mounted weatherproof speakers.

g. One NHTSA approved BTB.

h. Three compartments and a driver/passenger cab area. The compartments can be separately configured for command, briefing and driver functions by two fiberglass reinforced pocket doors. Windows are fitted with black-out curtains to facilitate privacy.

i. Considerations for inclement weather storage (hail, flooding, extreme heat/cold) must be made if possible in order to provide optimal operational capability.

j. One class 3 trailer hitch for a possible 5' x 8' single axle trailer.

7. Communications. Coordination with the installation G-6 must be accomplished to meet all federal, state, local, and installation regulations governing the use, licensing, and payment for all of the below listed communication assets and to obtain numbers and frequencies from all required agencies. Additionally, the PM/PC should coordinate to obtain a Land Mobile Radio, once fielded, if applicable. Minimum communications specifications include the following:

a. Two UHF 380 - 470 MHZ radios.

b. Two VHF 138 - 176 MHZ radios.

c. One Truck UHF 800 MHZ radio.

d. One electronic telephone switching system capable of connecting three landlines, one cellular line, and two satellite lines.

e. One fax detection card.

f. Eight twelve - line speakerphone telephones with 16-digit alphanumeric LCD display.

g. One fixed wireless terminal cellular telephone.

h. Two mobile satellite telephones.

8. Computers. Maximum communications capability in an incident

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response scenario requires contingency planning for both availability and inoperability of the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) system. Electronic communications must be available for the installation commander, and designated emergency response personnel as follows:

a. One laptop computer. This open purchase computer allows the PM/PC the flexibility to install PMO/MCPD specific software to help accomplish his/her mission.

b. The PM/PC should coordinate through the installation G-6 section to obtain two NMCI computers for the MCP.

c. One multifunction printer-fax-scanner-copier.

d. One two-way Internet satellite system receiver with secure service access.

9. All MCPV operators must be trained and fully familiar with the MCPV operations, technical specifications, and communications procedures. This will maximize its value in an incident or event scenario.

10. Training

a. Initial. The MCPV manufacturer provides service manuals and initial training upon vehicle delivery. During delivery, the manufacturer provides up to eight hours of orientation instruction on MCPV installed systems (i.e. generator start-up and shut down procedures) leveling system operation, mast operation, basic audio/video system operation, basic alarm operation, awning set up, etc.

b. Sustainment. Local operators/users must complete designated sustainment training to preclude damage and or injury during MCPV operations.

c. Driving. All MCPV operators must meet federal, state, and installation driving requirements, and demonstrate proficiency while driving the MCPV in a secure training area/environment prior to employment.

d. Dispatch/Communications Procedures. MCPV operators will maintain a proper logbook to record mileage, destination and use. All personnel operating the MCPV must also have NIMS/ICS forms on-hand, and be trained in their use. Assignment of a formally trained, full time dispatcher from the Dispatch/

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Communications Center to the MCPV team is highly encouraged, when available.

#### 11. Modifications

a. Exterior and interior modifications are discouraged and only authorized by the PM/PC to ensure warranties of the MCPV and ancillary equipment are not voided.

b. Additional electrical attachments are discouraged, and should be thoroughly researched prior to operation, as they could overload the maximum electrical output of the MCPV generator.

#### 12. Maintenance

a. MCPV users should follow all manufacturer and installation preventive and corrective maintenance schedules. At a minimum, monthly/quarterly/annual and manufactured preventive maintenance records will be maintained by the PMO/MCPD.

b. Maintenance should be extended beyond the vehicle itself. As a mobile supportive element, PMs/CPs should ensure that internal support items (e.g. evidence collection equipment, communications equipment and administrative supplies (paper, ink cartridges)) are available and fully functional. After use and quarterly inventories are recommended.

c. It is the responsibility of the PM/PC to ensure that damage to the MCPV is repaired in a timely manner in order to ensure the mobility and availability in the event of required emergency deployment. All damages incurred, beyond the expiration of warranties are the responsibility of the PM/PC and installation commander assigned to fund. Proactive safety and training measures will assist in keeping damage to a minimum.

#### 13. Safety. MCPV operators must meet all driving safety regulations and requirements.

a. Develop an installation specific safety SOP for the utilization of the MCPV incorporating hazardous weather/road driving conditions (i.e. high winds, black ice, etc).

b. The MCPV will be operated with a driver and A-driver at all times. The A-driver shall dismount and act as a backing guide every-time the MCPV is backing, placed in reverse, or



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utilized in tight spaces or locations due to its bulk and external assets.

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## Section 10900 - Other Special Purpose Vehicles

10901. Purpose. This section establishes PMO/MCPD guidelines and limitations concerning the use of other special purpose vehicles.

10902. Policy. It is the policy of the Marine Corps to properly equip and maintain special purpose vehicles, and to ensure such vehicles are operated properly by authorized and qualified personnel.

10903. Definitions

1. Other Special Purpose Vehicles. A vehicle other than an administrative or regular patrol car used for special operations and events, including MWD/CPWD vehicles, motorcycles, tactical response vehicles, all terrain vehicles (ATVs), and utility vehicles.

2. All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs). A small vehicle, typically four wheeled, designed to be operated off road and on which a person sits astride a seat/saddle.

3. MWD/CPWD Vehicle. A patrol vehicle utilized for and specially equipped to transport a MWD/CPWD.

4. Tactical Response Vehicle (TRV). A vehicle normally utilized by SRTs during training and in response to high risk situations.

5. Utility Vehicle. Small vehicles normally designed to be operated off road and not configured to be operated on roadways, such as Kawasaki Mules, Yamaha Rhinos, golf carts, Cushman utility vehicles, John Deere Gators, etc.

10904. Procedures1. MWD/CPWD Vehicles

a. MWD/CPWD vehicles are used to transport its police MWDs/CPWDs for routine patrol, for training/travel, and to scenes where the use of a MWD/CPWD is needed.

b. MWD/CPWD vehicles are authorized to be used in any situation/manner that patrol vehicles are used, except that prisoners will not be transported in a MWD/CPWD vehicle, unless

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properly equipped to transport prisoners and the MWD/CPWD is not present.

c. MWD/CPWD vehicles are not authorized to transport stray animals. This is to prevent the spread of diseases to a MWD/CPWD.

d. MWD/CPWD vehicles may be operated by anyone qualified to operate an emergency vehicle, however, the MWD/CPWD handler must be present if the MWD/CPWD is in the vehicle. Operators must be trained in the operation of the vehicle as well as its care and maintenance.

e. MWD/CPWD vehicles will be equipped with the same items as a patrol vehicle (see section 5500), as well as special equipment to support the MWD/CPWD.

## 2. Tactical Response Vehicles (TRV)

a. The TRV is equipped to respond to high risk situations occurring aboard installations. Due to the possibility of gunfire or other hazardous conditions, the TRV should be armored and capable of deploying personnel away from hostile fire (for example, Lenco BearCat).

b. The need for deployment of the TRV shall be determined by the SRT Commander, in consultation with the PM/PC, Operations Officer.

(1) The vehicle is equipped to serve as a personnel and equipment carrier for the SRT. It is used in high risk situations when it can provide an area for SRT members to work and transport SRT equipment.

(2) The TRV should be used in most situations to which the SRT is deployed, including training. These events include, but are not limited to the following:

- (a) Terrorist situations.
- (b) Hostage and barricaded subject situations.
- (c) Sniper incidents.
- (d) High risk rescue operations.

c. The TRV should be equipped with the following equipment:

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- (1) Emergency lights.
- (2) Siren and PA system.
- (3) Fire extinguisher.
- (4) First aid kit.
- (5) Communications equipment.

d. Optional equipment for the TRV may include the following:

- (1) Video recording equipment.
- (2) Flood light system.
- (3) Equipment racks.
- (4) Weapons racks.

e. The TRV operator will be a MP/police officer, normally part of the SRT, with the following qualifications:

- (1) Safe driving record.
- (2) Qualified to operate the vehicle.
- (3) Free from injury or disability that could prevent physical performance and prevent the member from performing the essential duties of the position.
- (4) Willingness to train each month during the year.
- (5) Trained in all aspects of the operation of the vehicle and its intended uses.

### 3. Utility Vehicles and ATVs

a. These vehicles are used to support numerous activities by PMOs/MCPDs such as perimeter checks, flight line security, special event support/patrolling, off road/beach patrols, etc.

b. There is no specific paint color required for these vehicles, however, if used as off road emergency response vehicles, they will have:

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(1) "MP" or "MPCD" in lettering on each side of the vehicle.

(2) Emergency lights.

(3) Siren.

(4) Mobile radio transceiver.

(5) Public address system.

c. Operators of these vehicles shall be qualified to operate them. Typically, an 8 hour ATV operator course will be completed. PMs/CPs should work with the installation Safety Office to establish training requirements.

d. Operators of ATVs will wear all equipment required to operate motorcycles aboard Marine Corps installations and any additional safety equipment required locally.

#### 4. Motorcycles

a. All motorcycles used for patrol or traffic will have "MP" or "MPCD" in lettering on each side of the motorcycle and be equipped with the following minimum equipment:

(1) Emergency lights.

(2) Siren.

(3) Mobile radio transceiver.

(4) Public address system.

b. All operators of motorcycles shall be qualified to operate motorcycles, with a minimum of a state motorcycle operator's license and completion of the Motorcycle Safety Foundation Rider Safety Course. An additional course should be developed locally to address motorcycle patrol operations.

c. Motorcycle operator equipment will include the standard equipment of MPs/police officers assigned to Operations Division and all equipment required to operate motorcycles aboard Marine Corps installations.

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## Chapter 11

Operations Specialized Capabilities, Special Response and Other Procedures

## Section 11000 - Special Reaction Team

11001. Purpose. This section provides guidelines for SRT operations.

11002. Policy

1. Installation commanders are authorized to establish SRTs per this Order. The PM/PC shall establish and maintain a SRT and/or enter into an agreement with a local police/sheriff department for the provision of special response forces. Commanders and PMs/CPs should consider that local and federal law enforcement may not be able or willing to tactically respond to incidents aboard military installations, for a variety of reasons.

2. When a SRT is established, it must be capable of performing the following functions:

- a. Isolating the scene.
- b. Tactically responding from an assembly area to the scene.
- c. Affecting an entry.
- d. Employing clearing techniques (e.g., enhanced MOUT skills).

11003. Procedures

1. SRT membership will be determined by the PM/PC. The formation of a SRT of at least 10 members is highly recommended in order to ensure the team possesses all the required capabilities. The SRT should consist of an SRT Commander, not less than five personnel comprising an entry element and ideally a four man cover element that should contain exceptional and/or specially trained marksmen. MPs/police officers regardless of their assignment within PMO/MCPD (traffic control, logistics support, etc.) may be assigned to an SRT. SRT selection is addressed in section 4300:

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## 2. SRT Training Requirements

a. SRT members must receive initial and periodic sustainment training in the specialized skills associated with critical incident resolution. Initial training must come through one of the following:

(1) U.S. Army SRT course, Ft. Leonard Wood, MO. Upon successful completion, MPs will receive secondary MOS 5815.

(2) A federal/state certified (for example, FBI SWAT) or PMO/MCPD approved training course.

b. The SRT should receive a minimum of four hours of sustainment training each week on tactics and/or weapons firing. Entry team personnel should conduct familiarization fires monthly and qualify quarterly with their assigned weapons. The recommended Designated Marksman bi-monthly qualification is engagement of a two inch bull's-eye target from the prone position at a range of 100 meters, hitting five out of five shots without time limit. Designated Marksman should conduct familiarization fires on a monthly basis, with an emphasis on multiple target engagements with a time limit, and synchronized (coordinated with entry team movements) shooting drills. Familiarization shooting drills should be conducted at unknown distances.

3. SRT Capability. The PM/PC will ensure that SRT members meet the individual training standards contained in reference (x). This applies to both MPs and police officers. The process will include a demonstrated ability to perform the following training standards to the installation commander's satisfaction:

a. SRT organization, employment, and mission planning concepts.

b. Resolving hostage/barricaded suspect situations.

c. Team tactics for maneuver, building clearing, and actions "on-scene" to include immediate action drills in response to unplanned surrender and continued resistance.

d. Live fire employment of weapons in training scenarios.

e. Special entry methods to include breaching techniques.

f. Counterterrorism response.

g. Intra-team communications (for example, hand/arm signals).

h. Recognition and identification of weapons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), etc.

4. SRT Equipment. Only approved Marine Corps fielded weapons and ammunition will be employed by SRT personnel. When dictated by local requirements, the PM/PC, based on approval of the installation commander, may provide the SRT specialized equipment. A list of recommended SRT equipment is contained in paragraph 11003.6 below.

5. SRT Composition

a. SRT Commander. The SRT Commander is responsible to the PM/PC or his designee (for example, Deputy PM/PC, Operations Officer) for administrative supervision, operational coordination, and training management of the SRT. The SRT Commander should not be an operational member of the SRT. The SRT Commander should develop building containment plans for all installation critical facilities, develop SRT standard operating procedures, and acquire individual and team equipment. Additionally, the SRT Commander obtains facility blueprints, as required. During actual incidents, the SRT Commander is responsible to the IC (senior on-duty military police officer/SNCO at the incident scene who is directing and supervising the police response), for the overall planning and execution of an SRT operation, control over multiple entry elements, control and coordination of cover element(s), supporting marksman fire with the movements of the entry element, and coordination of SRT activities with the ICP. However, once the SRT begins an assault, respective team leaders should exercise control over their entry element(s).

b. Entry Element. An entry element shall consist of, at a minimum, a team leader, point man, first defenseman, second defenseman, and rear security/utility defenseman as described in figure 11-1.

c. Cover Element. Each four man cover element is comprised of two teams of a designated marksman and observer (spotter) as described in figure 11-1.



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d. All SRT members should cross-train in each of the entry element positions. Team leaders must be completely knowledgeable of each SRT member's duties.

<u>TEAM LEADER</u>	<u>POINTMAN</u>	<u>DEFENSEMAN</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organize and supervise an SRT</li> <li>- Coordinates planning, implementation, and training</li> <li>- Records all training that the team receives, certifying SRT member's duty proficiency</li> <li>- Plans and executes assaults</li> <li>- Controls cover and entry teams</li> <li>- Determines special needs</li> <li>- Ensures team weapons and equipment are accounted for</li> <li>- Prepares after-action reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Conducts reconnaissance/recommends primary and alternate routes of approach</li> <li>- Leads entry team during approach/assists defenseman in security role</li> <li>- Carries any special equipment and employs pyrotechnics at the command of the team leader</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Provides security for the point man during movement</li> <li>- Acts as point man when necessary and protects the entry element from ambush during approach and entry into the objective</li> <li>- Covers the entry element during withdrawal</li> <li>- Employs pyrotechnics at the command of the team leader</li> </ul>
<u>REAR SECURITY/UTILITY</u>	<u>MARKSMAN</u>	<u>OBSERVER OR RECORDER</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Provides rear security for the entry element during movement</li> <li>- Covers the entry element during withdrawal</li> <li>- Serves as assistant team leader</li> <li>- Carries additional equipment as necessary</li> <li>- Assists EOD in placement of prepared explosives and triggering breach</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Maintains surveillance on the subject area from a fixed position</li> <li>- Provides intelligence and information to team leader while in the surveillance role</li> <li>- Neutralizes hostile fire with well-planned shots at the command of, or with the permission of, the team leader</li> <li>- Provides cover for the entry element during initial entry</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Records all events prior to, during, and after the incident for use as evidence and information in the after action report</li> <li>- Provides security for the marksman</li> <li>- Assists marksman in locating hostile personnel</li> <li>- Relieves marksman as necessary</li> <li>- Employs CS at the command of the team leader</li> </ul>

Figure 11-1.--Team Composition and Member Responsibilities

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## 6. SRT Ammunition and Equipment

a. Ammunition. Ammunition (to include pyrotechnics and diversionary devices) will be procured per reference (bh); no other ammunition or munitions may be utilized without an appropriate waiver. Allocations of SRT training and operational (security) ammunition are prescribed in reference (bh). Ammunition selection, where discretionary (for example, 12 ga. 00 buckshot vs. slug rounds) should be determined by the team leader per SOP and applicable tactical plans.

b. Team Equipment. SRT team equipment items are fielded by the Marine Corps or purchased by the PMO/MCPD. See section 5200 for SRT uniforms. Figure 11-2 shows SRT weapon options.

<u>TEAM LEADER</u>	<u>POINTMAN</u>	<u>DEFENSEMAN</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- .45 cal (M1911A1) or 9mm (M9)</li> <li>- Rifle M16-A2 or 12 Gage Shotgun or</li> <li>- CQB entry Weapon, MP-5, or M-4</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- .45 cal (M1911A1) or 9mm (M9) or</li> <li>- CQB entry Weapon, MP-5, or M-4</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- .45 cal (M1911A1) or 9mm (M9)</li> <li>- Rifle M16-A2 or 12 Gage Shotgun or</li> <li>- CQB entry Weapon, MP-5, or M-4</li> </ul>
<u>REAR SECURITY/UTILITY</u>	<u>MARKSMEN</u>	<u>OBSERVER/RECORDER</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- .45 cal (M1911A1) or 9mm</li> <li>- Rifle M16-A2 or 12 gauge shotgun</li> <li>- CQB Entry Weapon, MP-5, or M-4</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 45 cal (M1911A1) or 9mm</li> <li>- Rifle M16-A2 or Assigned Sniper Weapon (when fielded)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 45 cal (M1911A1) or 9mm</li> <li>- Rifle M16-A2 or Assigned Sniper Weapon (when fielded) or M203 40mm grenade launcher</li> </ul>

Figure 11-2.--Team Member Equipment/Weapons

7. Basic High Risk Incident Management Plan. ICs should utilize the following basic six-step plan for managing a high risk incident and any SRT tactical planning should evolve around the following plan as a foundation.

a. Containment. Initial responding MPs/police officers should first establish an inner perimeter to reduce the suspect(s)' mobility to a minimal area. This action serves to establish the incident as a static problem instead of a mobile situation. Immediately upon arrival at the location of a high

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risk incident, the SRT should establish a tactical command post. The SRT Commander normally will determine the situation and issue a warning order. Initial employment of the SRT depends on the situation; however, marksman/observer teams deploy as soon as practicable to well concealed areas offering good firing positions, cover for the entry element's approach and a clear field of observation. Often the position of the marksmen/observers will be located where they can relieve a portion of the inner perimeter, but this is secondary to the accomplishment of their principal missions. The first responding entry element should plan for, rehearse and be prepared to execute an emergency assault on the objective. Unless the PMO/MCPD has an additional entry element(s), the entry element should plan for and conduct detailed rehearsals to execute the tactical option. Deployed SRT personnel should strive to remain well-rested should the incident become protracted. As determined by the SRT Commander, an additional entry element(s) may relieve the primary entry element(s).

b. Isolation. Establish an outer perimeter. MPs/police officers set the outer perimeter (as a "pseudo" safety zone) by posting traffic control points around the incident site and evacuating innocent persons exposed to potential harm.

c. Information/Intelligence Gathering. Gather as many essential elements of information (or confirmed intelligence), as possible, pertaining to:

- (1) Safe access routes to ICP.
- (2) Objective site features, including interior layout and probable location of suspect(s)/hostage(s) in structure.
- (3) Objective site utilities, including intrusion detection system.
- (4) Presence of guard dogs/other animals.
- (5) Avenues of approach to objective.
- (6) Surrounding area features.
- (7) Suspect(s) identifying characteristics.
- (8) Hostage(s) identifying characteristics.
- (9) Suspect(s) criminal, medical, and personal history.

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(10) Hostages(s) criminal, medical, and personal history.

(11) Suspect(s) training and capabilities.

(12) Suspect(s) weapons and ammunition.

(13) Suspect(s) activities.

(14) Suspect(s) access to transportation.

(15) Background information on suspect(s) contacts.

d. Negotiation. CID or Investigations Branch (or NCIS if a hostage negotiator is not available in PMO/MCPD) hostage negotiators will attempt to resolve the situation without force, if possible. However, the SRT should expect negotiations to be protracted and must be prepared to conduct an emergency assault without advance notice. Ensure planning is concurrent with and accounts for the negotiation (CID, Investigations Branch, and/or NCIS) effort.

e. Tactical Resolution. Anticipating that negotiations may fail, SRT tactical planning will (at a minimum) formulate courses of action for the employment of CS and/or smoke, engagement by designated marksmen, and/or assault by the entry team. However, an assault should be attempted only as a last resort and after all other methods have failed or are deemed impractical. A SRT should not be committed to a tactical resolution of a high risk incident if it exceeds SRT operational capabilities. Any order by the IC, PM/PC, installation commander or designee directing the SRT to exercise a tactical option should be given through the SRT Commander.

f. Apprehension/Surrender. Once an objective has been seized, SRT should immediately restrain (handcuff or flexi-cuff) and search all occupants, whereupon all injuries will be triaged and treated. All occupants are turned over to the senior investigative personnel at the scene. Known hostage(s) should be removed from the objective and safeguarded until investigative personnel take custody of them and confirm their identity; a hysterical or sympathetic (to the suspect) hostage must be regarded as dangerous to the SRT and themselves until authorities establish positive control over the objective site. After the SRT turns over all occupants to investigators, MPs/police officers should immediately establish security around the objective site enabling investigative personnel to properly

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conduct a search of the crime scene. No personnel should be allowed to enter the crime scene without the prior authorization of the supervisory investigator, IC, PM/PC or installation commander.

#### 8. Employment

a. General Precepts. In the event of an actual high risk incident aboard the installation, the initial MP/police precepts are to contain the threat to the smallest area possible, stabilize the situation with the least amount of force, and adhere to strict weapons discipline. The easing of anxieties and tensions, whenever possible, is important to allow the suspect(s) time to evaluate their situation rationally. Proper utilization of time is critical. Rapid planning by the SRT entry and cover elements is essential, even though hostage negotiators normally prolong negotiator-suspect-hostage interaction. Use of force against the suspect(s) should be used as a last resort option. Use force shall be executed per chapter 6 and reference (ac).

#### b. SRT Response/Incident Resolution (Options)

(1) Upon recall, the SRT Commander and entry team leader(s) should determine the nature of the incident, formulate an estimate of the situation, and determine what team equipment is required. All recalled SRT members should initially present themselves to a pre-designated location to draw their individual weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Once the entry team leader(s) briefs the SRT on the incident, the SRT normally relocates to a covered, concealed assembly area near the location of the incident.

(2) The SRT Commander shall respond to the scene as soon as possible. Depending on the situation and well-being of any hostages, the SRT Commander may accomplish the following actions:

(a) Report to the IC upon arrival.

(b) Determine location of the SRT tactical command post apart from the ICP and notify SRT members at the assembly area to displace.

(c) Account for recalled SRT members and supplementary personnel.

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(3) Brief SRT personnel and supplementary personnel on the situation; establish assignments and positions, as required.

(4) Assign an entry element to plan, rehearse and execute an emergency assault on order.

(5) Approve the general location of the marksman/observer team location(s).

(6) Formulate the tactical plan for resolving the incident. Assign SRT members to functions supporting the plan and brief the IC. The tactical plan will consider the following potential courses of action:

(a) Containment.

(b) CS agent employment.

(c) Selective marksman fire.

(d) Assault.

(7) Establish a radio link to the IC and parallel communication to other agencies, as necessary.

(8) Evaluate available resources and request any other specialized equipment or additional supplementary personnel not already available.

c. If negotiations are established, the SRT should use that time to formulate and refine the tactical plan, coordinate with outside tactical agencies if necessary, and rehearse the tactical plan.

d. Until the incident is resolved, the entry team leader(s) should remain in constant contact with the SRT Commander and take no offensive action unless directed by the IC. Assault by the SRT is a last resort. Also, the SRT should not conduct a sophisticated assault (for example, coordinated entry) if ill-prepared. In those situations where the incident is well contained and there are no hostages in danger or time sensitive circumstances requiring rapid resolution of the incident, other means of resolution shall be considered.

9. Medical Response. If any person within the outer perimeter becomes ill or injured, the corpsman supplementing the SRT should:

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a. Request the nearest emergency medical support (EMS) unit to present themselves to a designated location on the outer perimeter where the patient will be moved for treatment.

b. Administer emergency first aid until the patient can be moved to the EMS unit.

#### 10. Post Incident Actions

a. Personnel Accountability. The SRT Commander and IC should physically account for and determine the status/well-being of their respective personnel, suspect(s), and others directly involved as participants in resolution of the incident.

b. Weapons/Ammunition Accountability. The SRT Commander will ensure all friendly and adversary weapons and ammunition are accounted for and placed in a safe condition. Ammunition inventories are important so all rounds can be accounted for at the scene.

c. Preservation of Crime Scene. The IC shall position MPs/police officers to preserve the integrity of the crime scene and summon criminal investigators (or NCIS Special Agents, as applicable) to the scene.

d. Report Preparation. The SRT Commander shall prepare a detailed statement to supplement the IR of the incident. Each SRT member's statement should document their activities and observations throughout the duration of the incident response. The designated MPs/police officers assigned to maintain the chronological log of activities may assist SRT members in the accurate preparation of their statements.

e. Debriefing. The SRT Commander should direct that every SRT member involved in the incident assemble at a place determined by the SRT Commander in order to debrief the actions of the SRT as a whole and its individual members.

(1) The SRT Commander shall ensure reports are prepared as soon as practicable after the debriefing.

(2) An installation serious incident stress debriefing team or chaplains should be used when needed and available.

f. Inventory. Both the SRT Commander and IC should provide a detailed account of:

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(1) Weapons employed during the incident, by:

(a) Manufacturer.

(b) Model.

(c) Serial number.

(2) Arrival and actions of all involved personnel throughout the incident.

(3) Injuries to personnel, subsequent treatment, and present medical condition (for Accident/Injury Report).

(4) Damage to vehicles, equipment, and personal property.

(5) Information released to media.



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Section 11100 - Military Working Dogs and  
Civilian Police Working Dog Assets

11101. Purpose. This section provides guidelines for Military Working Dogs (MWD) and Civilian Police Working Dogs (CPWD) assets.

11102. Policy. The MWD/CPWD provides the installation commander and the PMO/MCPD with an extremely versatile tool for performing police duties and protecting military resources. The installation commander must certify MWD/CPWD teams annually, upon change in installation commander, and/or when a handler receives a new MWD/CPWD, per reference (bm). The authority to certify the MWD/CPWD teams may be delegated (and usually is) to the PM/PC, per reference (bm).

11103. Procedures

1. The PM/PC shall ensure MWDs/CPWDs and handlers are trained and certified per this section, references (ac), (bl), (bm), (bk), (bo), and (bp).

2. The Operations Officer is responsible for operating the MWD/CPWD program in PMOs/MCPDs.

3. Operations/Training Procedures

a. The Kennel Master shall:

(1) Prescribe required training for MWD/CPWD teams.

(2) Evaluate monthly training and assign remedial training when necessary.

(3) Provide the Operations Officer and subsequently, the PM/PC with training records for review each quarter to maintain detector dog team certification.

(4) Assign trainers, normally NCOs/senior MWD/CPWD handlers, within the section.

(5) Maintain annual MWD/CPWD certification.

(6) Ensure designated personnel maintain certification in the safe handling, storage and transportation of explosive training aids.

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(7) Ensure the daily maintenance and cleanliness of all MWD/CPWD training areas, kennels and office space.

(8) Ensure all MWD/CPWD training areas, kennels and office spaces are secured when unattended.

(9) Know the mission of the command and advise personnel of the best use of MWD/CPWD teams.

(10) Know the threats to and vulnerabilities of resources protected by MWD/CPWD.

(11) Ensure an effective MWD/CPWD training program is developed, implemented, and documented.

(12) Ensure assigned MWD/CPWD teams are skilled in their duties by conducting semi-annual validations.

(13) Ensure that adequate provisions are made for the health, safety, and well-being of MWDs/CPWDs.

(14) Ensure that handlers are knowledgeable of the physical and psychological characteristics and capabilities of their MWDs/CPWDs, basic principles of conditioning, and the ideal employment of each type of MWD/CPWD.

(15) Obtain equipment and supplies for the MWD/CPWD section.

(16) Obtain emergency veterinarian procedures, to include a detailed map, that are provided by the local U.S. Army Veterinarian Corps Officer (VCO) for medical emergencies when the attending VCO is unavailable.

(17) Ensure patrol dog (PD) team validation standards are met prior to assignment to patrol duties. PD team certification is to be accomplished quarterly.

(18) Will conduct PD team validation on a yearly basis.

(19) Ensure that all new or renovation kennel construction plans are reviewed by the attending VCO.

(20) Maintain accountability/serviceability of all equipment.

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(21) Assist in preparing unit Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Letters of Instruction (LOIs) for team assignments; and ensure handlers compliance with unit SOP and LOI.

(22) Ensure designated personnel maintain the safe handling, storage and transportation of drug training aids.

b. Trainers shall:

(1) Schedule and coordinate the MWD/CPWD training program. Ensure an optimum training plan is developed for each MWD/CPWD team.

(2) Ensure training standards meet the minimum requirements of reference (bm).

(3) Assume the Kennel Master's duties in his absence.

(4) Keep the Kennel Master informed of her/his team's status.

c. Handlers shall:

(1) Maintain proficiency by meeting the optimum training plan, Marine Corps essential subjects, individual training and readiness standards, and MWD/CPWD handling skills.

(2) Feed, train, groom, and employ assigned MWD/CPWD per guidelines set by Kennel Master/Trainer.

(3) Monitor their assigned MWD'S/CPWD'S health and notify the Kennel Master of any illness or injury.

(4) Maintain the team's training and utilization record.

4. Drug Training Aids. PMOs/MCPDs must store drug training aids in a GSA approved security container per chapter 4 of reference (bm).

a. Continental United States (CONUS) units must possess a current Controlled Substances Registration Certificate (DEA 223) authorizing possession and use of drug training aids. DEA 223 must be renewed annually. Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) units must receive written approval from the MWD Program Manager authorizing possession and use of drug training aids. OCONUS units must complete a transfer of MWD Team

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Training Aid Custodian Form when changing custodians per chapter 4 of reference (bm).

(1) Semi-annual inventory and weight checks by a disinterested person (E-7 or above) appointed by the PM/PC in writing, per chapter 4 of reference (bm).

(2) Training aid custodian and receipt forms per chapter 4 of reference (bm).

(3) Only personnel authorized by the PM/PC in writing may access narcotic training aids. When removing narcotic training aids, authorized personnel shall:

(a) Sign the access log for the narcotics safe upon entry.

(b) Record in the access log the type of aid removed, date and time the aid was removed, the weight of the aid and the aid serial number.

(c) Remove only necessary amounts of each substance required for training.

(d) Secure the safe and record the time secured.

b. The PM/PC:

(1) Shall designate in writing a primary and alternate drug training aid custodian.

(2) May issue written authorization for MWD/CPWD teams to utilize PMO's/MCPD's drug training aids for conducting training while supporting counter-drug missions and deployments per chapter 4 of reference (bm).

c. The Kennel Master shall:

(1) Establish a local drug training SOP and be familiar with all associated references.

(2) Submit appropriate changes/updates for the drug training aid SOP to the PM/PC for approval.

(3) Ensure that the drug training aid SOP is reviewed annually by the PM/PC.

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(4) Ensure that only personnel authorized in writing by the PM/PC are allowed to handle or transport.

d. Only personnel authorized by the PM/PC in writing may access the drug training aids safe. When removing and returning drug training aids, authorized personnel shall:

(1) Complete the sign in/sign out log upon issue and turn in of drug training aids.

(2) All personnel authorized to handle drug training aids must be designated in writing by the PM/PC.

(3) The person receiving the drug training aids must be the same person returning the drug training aids

(4) All drug training aids must be returned during the same tour of duty unless authorized by the PM/PC.

(5) Secure the safe and record the time secured.

e. Damaged or leaking drug training aids will be separated immediately from the remaining drug training aids. The drug training aid custodian will contact the MWD program manager for further instructions.

f. Notification to the NCIS Resident Agent will be made immediately when there are any lost drug training aids or drug training aids are suspected of being tampered with.

5. Explosive Training Aids. Personnel authorized to handle or transport MWD/CPWD explosive training aids will adhere to the procedures established per reference (bk), chapter 5 of reference (bm), and chapter 2 of reference (bn).

a. PM/PC shall designate in writing a primary and alternate explosive training aid custodian

b. Kennel Masters shall:

(1) Establish a local explosive training aid SOP and be familiar with reference (bk), chapter 5 of reference (bm), and chapter 2 of reference (bn).

(2) Submit appropriate changes/updates for the explosive training aid SOP to the PM/PC and explosive safety personnel for approval.

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(3) Ensure the explosive training aid SOP is reviewed annually by the PM/PC.

(4) Ensure only personnel authorized in writing by the PM/PC are allowed to handle/ transport explosive training aids.

(5) Document annual explosives safety training per enclosure (2) of reference (bk).

(6) Ensure authorized personnel follow the procedures for safe handling and transportation of explosive training aids per reference (bk), chapter 5 of reference (bm), and chapter 2 of reference (bn).

c. All MWD/CPWD personnel shall:

(1) Contact installation weather before each training session.

(2) Notify the Fire Department, installation Safety Office, and the Dispatch/Communications Center of the training location and amount of explosives to be used.

(3) Post proper fire symbols and warning signs stating "DANGER EXPLOSIVE DOG TRAINING IN PROGRESS KEEP-OUT."

(4) All persons not actively involved will be evacuated to a minimum distance of 100 feet from the explosive(s).

(5) Smoking is prohibited within 100 feet of all explosive training.

(6) Ensure explosive training aids are only left out for the minimum time needed for training, and placed at least 10 feet apart.

(7) The net explosive weight must not exceed 7 pounds in any one training session.

(8) Contact Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) or munitions personnel if there is any doubt about the safe conditions of an explosive training aid.

d. Personnel utilizing the explosive scent kit shall:

(1) Conduct an inventory of all explosive training aids upon arrival at the storage facility.

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(2) Sign out all explosive training aids to be removed in the issue/turn in log inside the explosive training aid storage facility.

(3) Inventory explosive training aids at the completion of training to ensure all explosive training aids were removed from the training area.

(4) Visually check all explosive training aids to ensure no damage occurred during training.

(5) Return explosive training aids to storage facility, conduct an inventory, and properly complete the issue/turn in log.

(6) Rotate all dynamite monthly and annotate in the remarks section of the issue/turn in log.

e. Personnel transporting explosive training aids shall:

(1) Strictly comply with the guidelines set forth in reference (bk), chapter 5 of reference (bm), and chapter 2 of reference (bn).

(2) Use only government vehicles authorized to transport explosives.

(3) Ensure all placards and safety devices are in place.

#### 6. Health Care

a. The U.S. Army veterinarians provide complete medical care for MWDs/CPWDs.

b. Attending VCOs normally:

(1) Conduct kennel facility inspections as required.

(2) Designate in writing a local civilian veterinarian for emergency use including name, address, telephone number and detailed map.

(3) Formulate a MWD/CPWD feeding and exercise program.

(4) Assign deployment categories to all MWDs/CPWDs.

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7. MWD/CPWD Capabilities. The following provides the capabilities of each type of MWD/CPWD in the DOD inventory:

a. Patrol Dog (PD). PDs are a single purpose MWD/CPWD that provides a psychological deterrent and have the capability to pursue, bite and hold on command. PDs are capable of detecting the presence of unauthorized personnel and intruders by scouting (sight, scent, sound) in open areas and during interior building searches.

b. Drug Detector Dog (DDD). DDDs are a single purpose MWD/CPWD that detects drugs to reduce illegal use/trafficking. DDDs are primarily used on-leash. All DDDs are capable of detecting the drugs they are trained on and certified to detect. Detectable drugs may include marijuana, hashish, cocaine, methamphetamine and MDMA (ecstasy). DDDs can be locally trained to detect methamphetamines and MDMA (ecstasy).

c. Explosive Detector Dog (EDD). EDDs are a single purpose MWD/CPWD that detects IEDs and explosive components. EDDs are utilized to search bomb threat scenes and augment Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capabilities. EDDs are primarily used on leash. EDDs are capable of detecting the explosives that they are trained on and certified to detect. Refer to applicable references for detectable explosive odors.

d. Patrol/Drug Detector Dog (P/DDD). P/DDDs are a dual purpose MWD/CPWD that incorporates the capabilities of both PDs and DDDs into one dog.

e. Patrol/Explosive Detector dog (P/EDD). P/EDDs are a dual purpose MWD/CPWD that incorporates the capabilities of both PDs and EDDs into one dog.

f. Specialized Search Dog (SSD). SSDs are a single purpose MWD that detect IEDs, explosive components, and weapon caches off-leash up to 400m from the handler. SSDs may be utilized to search on leash, but is not the preferred method. SSDs are capable of searching vehicles, buildings, roadways, and open areas. The SSD handler directs the SSD in its search by using hand/arm signals, voice commands directly from the handler or via radio communications, or a combination of the above. SSDs are primarily used in support of the operating force but may be employed in garrison as an EDD. Refer to applicable references for detectable explosive odors.



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g. Combat Tracker Dog (CTD). CTDs are a single purpose MWD. In garrison, CTDs are capable of tracking missing persons, fleeing suspects, and escaped inmates. CTDs are primarily used on leash. When supporting the operating force, the CTD can track enemy combatants, IED planters/layers/makers, or friendly personnel who are missing or have been taken hostage. CTDs are capable of working in both urban and rural environments.

8. Employment. MWD teams may conduct walking or mobile patrols, locate and apprehend suspects, locate lost persons, assist with crowd control, detect narcotics or explosives, and promote positive community relations through demonstration of skills.

a. Each PM/PC will establish local SOPs on employment of MWDs/CPWDs. Subparagraphs 11103.8.c-h below provide sample procedures.

b. These procedures must conform to applicable references and/or host nation requirements.

c. Handlers, when assigned to work with Patrol Branch, shall:

(1) Present themselves for duty in conjunction with their assigned watch for weapons issue, vehicle checkout, roll call training, and Watch Commander's brief.

(2) Respond to calls, complete paperwork, process evidence and prisoners, and conduct other patrol functions as required by the Watch Commander.

(3) Respond to all unsecured buildings, with an additional MP/police officer, and conduct an interior and exterior search.

(4) Inform Watch Commanders of the MWD's/CPWD's capabilities and limitations.

(5) Conduct security checks while on patrol and checks on MWD/CPWD kennels every four hours.

(6) The Kennel Master shall schedule trainers for routine deployment with night watches.

d. During narcotics searches, handlers shall:

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- (1) Conduct searches per this section and reference (bm).
- (2) Clear nonessential personnel from the area.
- (3) Allow no one to enter the search area until the on-scene commander declares the area clear.
- (4) Have another handler act as a spotter, if available.
- (5) Have another MWD/CPWD team assist in large searches, if available.
- (6) If the MWD/CPWD alerts, conduct a search of the likely area the MWD/CPWD alerted, and if narcotics or paraphernalia is found, notify CID.

e. During explosive searches, the handler shall:

- (1) Conduct bomb threat responses, if applicable.
- (2) Proceed to the area after clearance from the IC. An additional handler will accompany the primary MWD/CPWD to act as a spotter and carry extra gear.
- (3) An explosive detection device may also be employed to search locations a MWD/CPWD cannot reach, likely sites a substance may be found, or randomly upon the team's discretion.
- (4) Mark an area of alert and collect as much information as possible in order to provide EOD a description/diagram of the area. Then depart as quickly and safely as possible.
- (5) Brief responding EOD personnel on the item location and method of marking.
- (6) Resume the search after EOD declares the device safe. Be aware of and look for secondary explosive devices. Follow on first responders must not be allowed in a search area until the entire area is clear.

f. Traffic Stops. During traffic stops, the MWD/CPWD may accompany the handler, as long as the MWD/CPWD does not pose a problem during these duties. The handler may use the MWD/CPWD for assistance during a felony traffic stop.

g. Searching Suspects. While searching suspects, handlers shall:

(1) Have a second MP/police officer present, if available.

(2) Use the MWD/CPWD as backup if no other units are available.

(3) Advise the suspect that the MWD/CPWD (if patrol dog trained) is trained to attack if he/she makes any sudden movements.

(4) Position the MWD/CPWD in a tactical advantageous position to the suspect(s) that allows the MWD/CPWD an unobstructed view of the search.

(5) Do not transport suspect(s) in MWD/CPWD team vehicles with MWDs/CPWDs present.

9. Use of Force. The MWD/CPWD is considered a weapon; therefore restrictions regarding the escalation of force are applicable when releasing a MWD/CPWD against a suspect; on or off leash, per chapter 6 and reference (ac). The MWD/CPWD is not considered deadly force per reference (ac).

a. Before releasing a MWD/CPWD, the handler shall:

(1) Be sure that the MWD/CPWD will perform a stand-off (cease an attack) upon command.

(2) Be sure that the MWD/CPWD obeys the commands "Out" and "Heel," or guards the suspect without re-biting the suspect.

(3) Be sure that the MWD/CPWD has identified the same target as the handler.

(4) Give a verbal warning order to halt or the handler will release the MWD/CPWD.

(5) Warn bystanders to cease all movement.

b. When releasing a MWD/CPWD to attack, the handler must:

(1) Follow the MWD/CPWD as closely as possible.

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(2) Call the MWD/CPWD off the attack immediately if it is attacking someone other than the suspect.

(3) Call the MWD/CPWD off the attack as soon as the suspect stops/indicates surrender.

(4) Regain leash control of the MWD/CPWD as soon as possible.

c. MWDs/CPWDs will not be released:

(1) If no suspect is in sight, except when searching an isolated area/abandoned building for a dangerous suspect.

(2) In the areas where children are present, except as a last resort short of using a firearm. If children involved in minor incidents fail to halt when challenged, the handler should follow them to their quarters instead of releasing the dog.

(3) Into a large crowd of people.

(4) In cases of minor offenses.

d. The on-duty Watch Commander shall:

(1) Ensure anyone injured by a MWD/CPWD receives timely treatment.

(2) Ensure handlers document MWD/CPWD bites on an IR, statement of force form and the Dispatch/Communications Center make proper notifications.

## 10. Safety

a. Safety must be the primary concern of the MWD/CPWD Section.

b. All handlers will familiarize themselves with the safety precautions and are responsible for the actions of their MWD/CPWD.

c. "Horseplay" with an MWD/CPWD is prohibited.

d. No one will touch or feed a MWD/CPWD other than MWD/CPWD personnel.

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e. MWD/CPWD handlers will not relinquish control of their MWD/CPWD to anyone other than another handler or veterinary personnel who are competent to handle the MWD/CPWD.

f. MWD/CPWD handlers will maintain a safe distance between all personnel and MWDs/CPWDs.

#### 11. Transportation

a. The MWD's/CPWD's health and security as well as the safety of all personnel is paramount when transporting MWDs/CPWDs.

b. A passenger type vehicle with a CPWD insert is the preferred method of transporting a MWD/CPWD for patrol duties.

#### c. MWD/CPWD Vehicles

(1) Vans and pick-ups should only be used in MWD/CPWD support operations. Use of these vehicles severely limit the handlers ability to access a MWD/CPWD quickly and are not recommended for MWD/CPWD patrol duties.

(2) MWDs/CPWDs are prohibited from being transported in privately owned vehicles (POVs) or in the front passenger seat of any vehicle.

(3) Rental vehicles procured for official use are considered government vehicles.

(4) MWDs/CPWDs will not be transported in vehicles used to transport stray animals.

(5) MWD/CPWD vehicles must have clear markings on all sides stating one of the following phrases:

(a) "Caution, Military Working Dog"

(b) "Caution, Working Dog"

(c) "Caution, Police Dog".

(6) No part of the MWD/CPWD will be allowed to protrude outside of a vehicle while the vehicle is in motion.

(7) A MWD/CPWD will not be left unsupervised in a vehicle.

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d. Transporting MWDs/CPWDs by Aircraft

(1) All transport crates will be marked with one of the following phrases:

(a) "Caution, Military Working Dog"

(b) "Caution, Working Dog"

(c) "Caution, Police Dog".

(2) Health Certificate

(a) All MWDs/CPWDs must receive a health certificate prior to traveling by air.

(b) A copy of the health certificate must be displayed in a clear bag on the top of the transport kennel.

(3) All MWDs/CPWDs will be muzzled when transported in the aircraft cabin with the handler.

(4) MWDs/CPWDs will be transported as excess baggage when traveling with a handler on commercial aircraft.

(5) When shipping an unaccompanied MWD/CPWD CONUS, the MWD/CPWD will be shipped as cargo.

(6) All MWDs/CPWDs must be accompanied by a qualified handler when transported by military airlift."

12. Evacuation Procedures. Written procedures for the evacuation of MWDs/CPWDs in case of a fire or natural disasters will be included in the MWD/CPWD SOP.

13. Support to Non-operational Missions

a. A MWD team consists of a school trained military handler and MWD that are certified in the detection of drugs or explosives by the search granting authority or designee (preferably the PM/PC).

b. A CPWD team consists of a school trained government service handler and a CPWD that are certified in the detection of drugs or explosives by the search granting authority or designee (preferably the PM/PC).

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c. Only certified MWD/CPWD teams are authorized to provide detection support to non-operational missions.

d. The U.S. Air Force has been designated as the DOD MWD Executive Agent (MWDEA) and will provide policy, procedures, and assign responsibilities for the DOD MWD Program. The Marine Corps MWD and CPWD program comprises a part of the overall DOD MWD population and as such is tasked by the DOD MWDEA (HQ, Security Forces Center, DOD Canine Program Management Office, Lackland AFB TX) to provide MWD and CPWD team assets on a fair-share basis. This requirement is tracked and further distributed by CMC (PS) to USMC MWD and CPWD teams aboard bases/stations that maintain MWD and CPWD assets within the Marine Corps according to geographic location.

e. Detailed MWD and CPWD mission notification procedures are as follows:

(1) MWDEA (OPERATIONS CENTER) receives requests from the United States Secret Service (USSS), Department of States (DOS), or other federal agencies for drug/explosive detection support.

(2) MWDEA (OPERATIONS CENTER) validates the request and identifies closest service(s) based on the proximity to mission location in order to minimize cost.

(3) MWDEA (OPERATIONS CENTER) notifies closest service(s) POC (MWD Program Manager) and provides mission details such as the protected, mission and location, mission timeframe (show up and departing time), POC name and contact number, number and type of MWD or CPWD teams required, any special instructions or requirements, and mission number.

(4) The MWD Program Manager then notifies the closest PMO MWD/MCPD CPWD Kennel Master or POC (designated by the PM/PC) by email and/or phone of the requested support. If requested, notification to the appropriate POCs for MARFORCOM, MARFORPAC, MCCDC, MCI-East, MCI-West, etc. will be provided for detection support.

(5) Requests for support are made considering mission location, OPTEMPO, and the number of certified MWD or CPWD teams on the installation.

(6) No PMO/MCPD will be tasked to provide support if the use of a MWD or CPWD team leaves the installation without

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adequate drug/explosive detector dog team support to perform installation operational requirements.

(7) Installation requirements. The minimum requirement for each installation is one certified Drug Detector Dog (DDD) or Patrol/Drug Detector Dog (P/DDD) team and one certified Explosive Detector Dog (EDD) or Patrol/Explosive Detector Dog (P/EDD) team.

(8) The installation PMO/MCPD POC must normally notify the Corps MWD Program Manager by email or phone within four (4) hours of initial notification unless otherwise annotated as to whether the installation PMO/MCPD is capable of providing the requested mission support.

(9) If the installation PMO/MCPD is capable of supporting the mission, the installation PMO/MCPD POC will immediately provide the required information (handler rank, last name, first name, middle initial and SSN and the MWD or CPWD name and tattoo number) of the supporting MWD or CPWD team(s) to the MWD Program Manager by email or phone.

(10) If the installation PMO/MCPD is not capable of supporting the mission, the installation PMO/MCPD POC must immediately notify by providing a non-support justification to the MWD Program Manager by email or phone.

(11) The MWD Program Manager then notifies MWDEA OPERATIONS CENTER by email or phone on whether or not the Marine Corps can provide the requested mission support.

(12) If the Marine Corps can provide mission support, the MWD Program Manager provides the MWDEA OPERATIONS CENTER by email or phone the supporting installation PMO MWD or MCPD CPWD team required information.

(13) The supporting installation PMO MWD or MCPD CPWD handler(s) must then contact the supporting mission agency (USSS, DOS, or etc.) POC for further instructions.

(14) MWDEA OPERATIONS CENTER prepares and releases the mission tasking message to the supporting service(s) MWD Program Manager.

(15) Mission tasking message will provide:

(a) Name of person requiring protection.



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- (b) Mission location.
- (c) Reporting time and location for mission brief.
- (d) Mission starting time, date and mission releasing time, date.
- (e) Mission POC: name and phone number.
- (f) Any special instructions or requirements.

(16) The MWD Program Manager will email or fax a copy of the mission tasking message to the supporting installation PMO/MCPD POC and to any other personnel who have been designated by the installation PM/MCPD PC to ensure mission parameters and specifics are received.

(17) Supporting installation PMO/MCPD POCS must ensure the supporting MWD/CPWD handler(s) receives a copy of the mission tasking message because it provides critical information pertaining to the mission.

(18) If the installation PMO/MCPD is unable to perform the mission after accepting or if any MWD/CPWD team experiences significant problems or delays in supporting the mission, the supporting MWD or CPWD handler(s) must contact the MWD Program Manager immediately for further guidance.

(19) If the installation MWD/CPWD POC is unable to contact the MWD Program Manager, the MWDEA OPERATIONS CENTER will be contacted directly at DSN 945-5649, 945-5650, 945-5651, Commercial (210)925-5649, (210)925-5650, (210)925-5651 or Toll Free 1-877-273-3098.

(20) The supporting MWD or CPWD team(s) present themselves at the mission location, perform mission, and return to their installation upon completion.

(21) The supporting MWD or CPWD handler(s) complete and submit travel claim IAW the instructions provided in the tasking message.

f. Funding Procedures, United States Secret Service (USSS)

(1) Funding responsibilities for mission taskings in support of the USSS to the President of the United States (POTUS) and Vice President of the United States (VPOTUS):

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(a) "Support provided to the USSS shall be made on a reimbursable basis except when DOD provides temporary assistance directly related to protecting the POTUS, VPOTUS, or other officer immediately in order of succession to the office of the president".

(b) Assignment of "closest available unit" has proven cost effective and will be the primary discriminator service tasking process and that incidental expenses and related costs such as travel, per diem and rental vehicles shall be borne solely by the service providing the required support.

(2) Funding procedures for POTUS/VPOTUS tasking missions:

(a) Since the support of POTUS/VPOTUS tasking missions are a Marine Corps supported function (not a PMO/MCPD supported function), the use of installation operating funds will be used to support these missions.

(b) If the installation Comptroller does not have the necessary operating funds to support the mission, the installation Comptroller contacts the next Comptroller within their chain-of-command until funding is achieved or until the request reaches CMC (P&R) for funding.

(c) Installation comptrollers and PMOs/MCPDs must plan to ensure adequate funding is available to provide MWD/CPWD team support to POTUS and VPOTUS support missions.

g. Support to Dignitaries Other than POTUS AND VPOTUS

(1) Funding responsibilities for mission taskings in support of the USSS to support dignitaries other than POTUS AND VPOTUS will be made on a reimbursable basis to include travel, per diem, and rental vehicle.

(2) Funding procedures for mission taskings in support of the USSS to support dignitaries other than POTUS AND VPOTUS. The mission tasking message released by the MWDEA OPERATIONS CENTER will provide the procedures and a POC for submission of claim for reimbursement.

h. Department of State (DOS)

(1) Funding responsibilities for mission taskings in support of the DOS:

(a) Mission requests are processed the same as USSS mission support taskings.

(b) Will be made on a reimbursable basis to include travel, per diem, and rental vehicle.

(2) Funding procedures for mission taskings in support of the DOS:

(a) MWDEA OPERATIONS CENTER will provide tasking support message to include TAD orders.

(b) Travel claims will be submitted to MWDEA OPERATIONS CENTER for reimbursement IAW the procedures outlined in the DOS tasking support message.

14. MWD/CPWD handlers will not be assigned duties involving stray animals.

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## Section 11200 - CBRNE Response

11201. Purpose. This section provides guidelines for MP/police response to CBRNE incidents.

11202. Policy

1. Marine Corps Installation (MCI) commands and installation commanders are required to implement comprehensive MCI and installation CBRNE preparedness programs. As it may be impossible to determine if a CBRNE release was an accident or a deliberate incident, MCI and installation CBRNE preparedness must include an all-hazards approach. The primary end state for MCIs/installations is to protect personnel, maintain critical missions, and restore essential functions.

2. The threat of attacks using CBRNE, especially chemical or biological agents, continues to be a significant concern. MPs/police should respond to all reports of suspicious letters, containers or packages. The safety of all persons involved is the first priority in such incidences. It is the responsibility of the responding MPs/police officers to assess the situation and, after appropriate consultation with supervisory personnel, make a determination whether to evacuate and the need for additional emergency responders to assist.

11203. Definitions

1. Chemical. Terrorists may exploit a myriad of toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) available in all parts of the globe. These substances are not likely to create as many actual casualties as warfare-strength agents, but are still potentially lethal. Chemical agents can be dispersed using mortars, sprayers, and improvised explosive devices. They can last from minutes to weeks at the site of release and create a larger initial hazard area than conventional explosives. Further, chemicals often create a temporary downwind vapor hazard.

2. Biological. Biological hazards pose unique challenges because they are relatively easy to produce and difficult to detect after release. Examples of terrorist biological weapons include small amounts of anthrax or smallpox dispersed using a non-explosive point source or spray tank. The duration of agent virulence and the size of the downwind hazard area are largely dependent on environmental conditions and dissemination efficiency at the time of the attack. The potential psychological impact and relative low cost of biological hazards

make them an attractive alternative to explosives. Offensive biological programs can be easily concealed, and production does not always require specialized equipment. Effective medical intervention is possible for many bacteria, but other pathogens (for example, viruses, fungi, toxins) can be much more difficult to treat.

3. Radiological. Low-level radiological material is available from a large number of industrial sources worldwide. Terrorists able to gain access to this material could exploit it using low-yield explosive devices. Specific examples of terrorist radiological hazards include iridium, cesium, and highly enriched uranium (HEU) as the core of a radiological dispersal device. Although rarely lethal in the near term, except in high doses, the deliberate dissemination of radioactive matter can cause considerable immediate psychological harm and enormous remediation/restoration.

4. Nuclear. Terrorists with sufficient finances will seek out those willing to sell both information and materiel regarding nuclear weapons. Besides the extremely high explosive nature of nuclear weapons, other effects include the generation of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP/EMP) that can degrade unprotected and vulnerable military and civilian electronics.

5. Explosive. Virtually every country, sub-national group, and terrorist organization has access to explosive devices. Traditionally, these have been the weapons of choice for terrorists because they are readily available, cheap, easy to use, and their effects are reasonably predictable. Although there is considerable psychological impact when terrorists use explosive devices, the actual casualties are likely to be significantly less than these other attacks and the casualties will be confined to the immediate vicinity of the blast.

#### 11204. Procedures

##### 1. Suspicious Packages and Containers Response

a. When a report of a suspicious package/container is received, the Dispatch/Communications Center should determine the following from the caller:

- (1) Whether anyone is in need of medical assistance.
- (2) The caller's name, location, and callback number.

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(3) The precise location of the suspicious package/container in question.

(4) Why the package/container is considered suspicious.

(5) Whether the package/container has been opened.

(6) If opened, whether anything suspicious was found inside.

b. Once this information is provided, the Dispatch/Communications Center shall:

(1) Advise the caller to leave the package/container where it is until the MPs/police arrive (if the package is still sealed), and to move themselves and all others away from the package/container.

(2) Advise the caller not to move, drop, or shake the package/container.

(3) Advise the caller to take the following additional steps if the package/container was opened and a residue was found:

(a) Close all windows and turn off ventilation, if inside.

(b) Leave the affected room or area, wash hands and exposed skin with soap and water.

(c) Avoid walking about the space and do not leave until MPs/police officers arrive.

(d) Ask all persons who have had contact with the package/container to follow the aforementioned precautions and ensure they remain in the immediate vicinity.

(4) Notify the caller to remain near a phone in a safe area and that emergency response personnel will be dispatched.

(5) Notify the Watch Commander.

(6) Assign patrol units to a specific location at a safe distance from the threatened area.

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(7) Telephonically notify the unit commander/senior unit representative of the threatened building.

(8) Notify CID/Investigations Branch.

(9) Dispatch the explosive MWD/CPWD teams to all explosive threats.

(10) Make notifications per section 7200. Notify the EOD (stand by), Notify Fire Department (stand by), Environmental Directorate (stand by), Medical (stand by), Public Affairs Office, and Safety Office.

c. Response/Assessment. Responding MPs/police officers shall:

(1) The initial response will vary, depending on the size and scope of the threat.

(a) Use code lights only if there is confirmation of an actual device. Ensure the code lights are turned off at least one block away from the threatened area so as not to alert any persons in the building or encourage any additional bomb threats.

(b) Leave police radios on in order to continue receiving instructions, but do not transmit within 300 feet of the affected area.

(c) When practical, establish a perimeter at least 300 feet from the building.

(d) MPs/police officers shall not:

1. Move, touch, approach or open the letter or package.

2. Attempt to smell or taste the contents.

3. Allow anyone to clean up the substance, if spilled.

(2) Perform a scene survey that includes a risk assessment of the threat for an IED prior to approaching any suspicious package. If an explosive threat exists, or an explosion has occurred, evaluate the scene, and logical approaches to the scene, for a secondary IED. If an explosive

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threat exists, it will take precedence over any biological threat until rendered safe. MPs/police officers must remain alert to the possibility of an IED or secondary devices of any sort. The first arriving MPs/police officers should evaluate the need for personal protective equipment (PPE,) if there is a suspected CBRN release.

(3) Interview the caller regarding the suspicious package to determine:

(a) Who has physically contacted the package/container.

(b) Why the caller believes the package is suspicious.

(c) If there is a return address on the package.

(d) If the package has been opened.

(e) If there are foreign substances inside.

(f) If there has been any correspondence that is either threatening or suspicious.

(g) If there have been any threatening notes or phone calls.

(4) Observe the package from a safe distance or by using binoculars to assess, to the extent possible, the following characteristics that may be indicative of CBRNE:

(a) Package/container has a powdery substance on the outside.

(b) Package/container is from an unexpected or unfamiliar source.

(c) Package/container is addressed to someone no longer working or residing at the address.

(d) Package/container has no return address, or one that cannot be verified as legitimate.

(e) Package/container has obvious misspellings of common words.



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(f) Package/container or package is of unusual shape, size, or weight.

(g) Package/container has an unusual amount of tape or string.

(h) Package/container is marked with restrictive endorsements such as "personal" or "confidential".

(i) Package/container has a strange odor or stain.

(j) Package/container shows city and state postmark that does not match the return address.

(k) Package/container has excessive postage.

(l) Package/container is addressed in block print or written or typed poorly.

(m) Package/container has protruding wires or aluminum foil.

(n) Package/container has a sound coming from the inside.

(5) If it can be determined that the package is not a threat, proceed to paragraph 11204.4.

(6) If it cannot be determined whether the package is a threat, notify a supervisor. The supervisor will evaluate the situation and determine whether the package is a possible threat and requires further examination/evaluation by specialized HAZMAT or EOD teams.

d. Containment/Investigation

(1) Should the incident scene/area be contaminated from the suspicious package, MPs/police officers shall perform the following to the extent that it does not unnecessarily risk lives or safety and subsequently render them unable to provide further assistance:

(a) Establish a perimeter to deny entry and to contain potentially exposed persons; direct persons to leave the immediate area of the hazard and proceed to a safe location where they can be sheltered-in-place (do not evacuate the

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building unless an immediate threat is evident) and decontaminated if necessary.

(b) To the extent possible, render first aid.

(c) Inform the Dispatch/Communications Center of the nature of visible injuries and number of injured or exposed persons.

(2) The Watch Commander or a patrol supervisor, or in their absence, the senior MP/police officer shall:

(a) Make contact with the unit commander/senior unit representative to:

1. Brief them on the situation.

2. If time is limited, evacuation of the facility must be implemented immediately.

3. Use only military personnel or civilian employees who are familiar with the area to help conduct an evacuation and to accompany the search team(s) when searching the interior/exterior of the building.

4. Obtain keys to all locked areas within the threatened area, and a diagram of the building.

(b) Establish an ICP, institute ICS protocols, and designate an IC.

(c) Coordinate the establishment of a sufficient perimeter to prevent further contamination, unauthorized entry into the area, and the destruction of evidence.

(d) Attempt to have all potentially exposed persons isolated and obtain identification information to permit follow-up contact by medical personnel.

(e) Coordinate appropriate traffic control measures.

(f) Ensure proper notifications are made.

(g) Ensure that CID/Investigations Branch is notified.

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(h) Notify the Post Office if the package involved travel through the U.S. Mail.

(i) To avoid possible contamination, before entering the threat area ensure that personnel are equipped with and utilizing proper personal PPE that conforms to NIOSH and OSHA regulations.

(j) Direct patrol units to conduct field interviews of all people within the surrounding area.

(3) Once the area has been isolated, the IC shall:

(a) Ensure notification, and if needed, dispatch of the Fire Department.

(b) Ensure that the installation Environmental Directorate, Safety Office, HAZMAT/NBC and/or EOD team has been notified and respond if needed.

(c) Instruct all personnel who were near or in direct contact with the suspect mail to thoroughly wash their face, hands and any exposed skin with soap and water and seek medical examination/treatment when deemed necessary (decontamination procedures for exposed persons should be in accordance with the Center for Disease Control's (CDC) protocols. Follow up with internal risk management procedures for workplace exposures/injuries).

(d) Consult with the Fire Department, Environmental Directorate, EOD, NBC, Safety Office, and/or Medical to determine the safest means of mitigation and the processing of evidentiary materials, giving special consideration to the safe handling and storage of suspected biological materials.

e. Fire, Environmental, NBC and/or Safety personnel will provide additional guidance once the package and/or substance is assessed. The assessment process may involve physical examination, field substance analysis, or collection for laboratory analysis. Decontamination, collection and further mitigation should be based on the assessment provided by HAZMAT personnel.

2. Evacuation Guidelines. The senior unit representative will determine whether to evacuate a building. Once the order to evacuate is received, evacuate personnel in accordance with the

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established fire evacuation plan. Other considerations to be taken are:

a. Evacuate in a calm and quiet manner to a designated location that is at least 300 feet (or as situation dictates) away from the threat. This is only a guideline. For example, if the threat is a potential large explosive device, MPs/police officers might seek to evacuate beyond 1000 feet and attempt to place other buildings between the threat and the evacuation area.

b. Ensure fire alarms or any electrical systems are not activated or deactivated.

c. Leave windows and doors open if an explosive device. Leave closed if CBRN.

d. Turn off gas appliances and close valves.

e. Ensure unit representatives account for their people.

### 3. Evidence Collection

a. For packages/substances deemed to be of no threat, routine evidence collection or property handling procedures may be utilized. Likewise, hoax items should be collected using standard collection procedures to ensure future prosecution.

b. Packages/substances that cannot be verified as safe on-site must be safely collected and packaged as appropriate by EOD, HAZMAT, etc. At a minimum, items should be double bagged in non-porous bags and completely sealed.

c. Special consideration must be given to the safe transport and storage of suspect packages/substances. These items shall be placed in a container that can be tightly sealed, such as an evidence "paint can", prior to being transported to the evidence storage room/facility.

4. Search Techniques. The senior MP/police officer will determine the direction and location to begin a search, if necessary. Use a two-man search team. Begin a search in the most accessible area. Conduct a search as follows:

a. Outside area: Conduct a sweep of the immediate outside area of the threat site.

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b. Inside area: Begin at the entrance from the ground floor working from floor to the ceiling. Check basements, furnace rooms, electrical control areas, and storage areas.

(1) Upon entering a room, go to different corners and stand quietly listening for a clockwork device.

(2) Divide the room into two equal parts. Each person will take half the room.

(3) Conduct the first sweep with both individuals standing back to back. Check all items from floor to waist level.

(4) Conduct the second sweep from waist to head level, checking all objects to the top of their head.

(5) Conduct the third sweep from head to ceiling.

(6) Conduct a fourth sweep all along the ceiling. Look through false or suspended ceilings. Include ventilation ducts and ceiling mounted fixtures.

c. Look for strange packages or devices that can not be identified by unit representatives. If a strange package/device is located, DO NOT TOUCH IT.

d. All personnel must exit and enter the threatened site by way of cleared areas only.

e. If a suspected explosive device is found, as stated above, DO NOT TOUCH IT! Notify EOD.

f. If a detonation time was given, evacuate search team(s) from the building 30 minutes prior. One hour after the reported detonation time, if directed by the senior MP/police officer, the MP/police officer search team(s) will resume the search.

g. When the search is complete, the IC will notify the senior unit representative who will determine if the building will be reoccupied.

5. The senior MP/police officer shall conduct a debriefing of all key personnel following the completion of operations and notify the PM/PC.

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## Section 11300 - Force Protection Conditions (FPCON)

11301. Purpose. This section establishes PMO/MCPD guidelines for FPCONs.

11302. Policy

1. Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) set the baseline FPCON for their respective area of responsibility per reference (w). The commanders of U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan set the baseline FPCON for their geographic areas. Service components and subordinate commanders will set their FPCON no lower than the baseline set by their higher headquarters, and may implement additional measures or a higher FPCON, as deemed necessary. The installation commander will declare a FPCON level appropriate for his location.

2. To enhance the overall effectiveness of a given FPCON, installation commanders shall develop and implement a random antiterrorism measures (RAM) program, including random vehicle inspections, as an integral part of their antiterrorism (AT) program per reference (w). While each FPCON has specific RAM requirements, commanders have the authority to implement RAMs from higher FPCONs when threat estimates suggest that lower FPCONs may not be adequate in view of the risk, vulnerability, and criticality of the assets at the installation.

3. Installations directing implementation may add measures from higher FPCONs at their discretion. Commanders may implement additional FPCON measures on their own authority, develop and implement additional measures specifically tailored for site-specific security concerns, or declare a higher FPCON for their AOR/installation.

4. PMs/CPs play a critical role in the FPCON process and shall work closely with installation staffs to develop and implement an effective program. Additionally, since MPs/police officers perform many of the RAMs, PMs/CPs must advise the installation commander on the sustainability of RAMs and requirements for augmentation if the PMO/MCPD is not sufficiently staffed to perform all required tasks.

11303. Definitions

1. FPCON levels are selected by assessing the terrorist threat, the capability to penetrate existing physical security systems at an installation, the risk of a terrorist attack taking place,

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the ability of units or installations to carry-on with missions if attacked, and the criticality of the installation mission(s) or assets. Assessed threat levels do not dictate the specific FPCON posture that a geographic location assumes.

2. Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMs). The implementation of multiple security measures in a random fashion. When activated, RAM provides a "different look" at security procedures in effect, to deny the terrorist surveillance team the opportunity to accurately predict security actions. The plan is used throughout all FPCONs and consists of using selected security measures from higher FPCONs as well as other measures not associated with FPCONs. Using a variety of additional security measures in a normal security posture prevents overuse of security forces, as would be the case if a higher FPCON were maintained for an extended period of time. RAMs are implemented in a strictly random manner, never using a set time frame or location for a given measure. For installations, random vehicle inspections and commercial vehicle inspections are a type of RAM conducted at installation exterior entry/exit gates.

11304. Procedures

1. PMs/CPs shall work with installation staffs to:

a. Develop and implement procedures and processes to establish and adjust FPCON measures.

b. Examine the threat, physical security, terrorist attack consequences, and mission vulnerabilities in the context of specific DOD activities and the declared FPCON. When factors are combined and the collective terrorist threat exceeds the ability of the current physical security system (barriers, surveillance and detection systems, MP/police/security forces, and dedicated response forces) to provide the level of protection required, then implementation of a higher FPCONs or additional RAMs from a higher FPCON is appropriate.

c. Develop and implement, in coordination with the installation commander and/or the installation AT officer (ATO), a RAM program as an integral part of the AT program to enhance the overall effectiveness of a given FPCON. The basic concept of randomly implementing measures from higher FPCONs, command developed measures, or locally developed site-specific measures to supplement or enhance security measures or FPCONs already in place, is to alter the installation or facility security signature by introducing uncertainty for planners and organizers

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of terrorist attacks. Advantages of implementing RAMs include, but are not limited to:

(1) Variations in security routines make it more difficult for terrorists to target important assets, build detailed descriptions of significant routines, or predict activities by a specific asset or within a targeted facility or installation.

(2) Increased AT awareness for DOD personnel, their dependents, visitors, and neighbors.

(3) Increased alertness among law enforcement, security, and base or facility personnel.

(4) Reduced adverse operational effects and unplanned economic costs when enhanced AT measures must be maintained for extended periods.

d. Develop and implement, in coordination with the installation commander and/or his ATO, local security procedures to defend against terrorism, and support these procedures with adequate planning, exercise, and evaluation.

e. In coordination with the installation commander and/or installation ATO, identify those installation assets likely to become terrorist targets, paying particular attention to mission essential vulnerable areas (MEVA) and identify appropriate defensive/countermeasures to protect those assets.

f. Obtain and review area threat assessments prepared by the NCIS Multi Threat Alert Center (MTAC). This assessment should be considered a working document and be updated, as necessary, based on information received from local law enforcement agencies and any information gathered locally that might indicate terrorist surveillance or probing.

g. Integrate terrorism scenarios into training exercises, whenever practical.

2. Operations Officers shall develop and implement, as directed, FPCON procedures, processes and measures.



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## Section 11400 - Response to Schools

11401. Purpose. This section provides guidance for MPs/police officers responding to calls for service and dealing with incidents on school property during school hours or during school-sanctioned events.

11402. Policy

1. Responding to calls for service or conducting investigations on school property requires an understanding of the limitations and requirements placed on MPs/police officers by law and the responsibility of school authorities for the supervision of children under their care. As such, investigations and police business conducted on school property will be in compliance with accepted legal practices and in recognition of the authority and responsibility of school officials to manage the school environment.

2. This section pertains to dealings with juveniles on school property during school hours or during school-sanctioned events after normal school hours. It does not pertain to juveniles using school facilities after school hours or juveniles trespassing or committing offenses on school property after school hours.

3. Additionally, this section recognizes that during the last decade, schools have increasingly become a target for discontented students and even total strangers. This section provides guidance to MPs/police officers for responding to schools in an emergency situation, such as an armed student or an armed intruder at the school.

11403. Procedures

1. Emergency response to schools shall be coordinated with school officials unless the delay to notify or such notification would potentially jeopardize the ability of MPs/police officers to safely and effectively respond to the emergency situation.

a. The PM/PC shall develop, in coordination with the school principal, an emergency response plan to the school for incidents involving, at a minimum: armed students, armed intruders, disorderly students, threats involving explosives, and hostage situations. This plan should have the following objectives, in the precedence listed:

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(1) Protect the safety and welfare of the students and staff.

(2) Protect the school facilities and property.

(3) Restore the school to normal conditions in the shortest time possible.

b. Response to schools can be an extremely emotional event. Crimes against children often evoke angry emotions, and MPs/police officers may have children enrolled in the school. MPs/police officers must remain calm and think clearly when responding to serious incidents at schools. Law enforcement supervisors will exercise caution when sending MPs/police officers on an emergency response to a school where MPs/police officers have children enrolled. Conducting emergency response drills and exercises to schools can provide a "routine" to the response that can minimize the effect of emotions.

c. Drills and Exercises. The purpose of any drill or exercise is to reveal planning weaknesses; reveal resource needs and shortfalls; improve coordination; clarify roles and responsibilities; and improve overall performance of all players. Exercises with key school personnel, back-ups, and other local emergency responders should occur on a regular basis.

(1) Tabletop exercises provide an opportunity to resolve coordination and responsibility issues through a low-stress discussion of the issues.

(2) Functional exercises simulate a real emergency under high-stress conditions by testing coordination among various functions and response agencies.

(3) Full-scale exercises test an entire community's response capability. This involves using real equipment.

## 2. Interviewing/Interrogating Students

a. Except in exigent circumstances or in detention situations as outlined in this section, MPs/police officers who wish to detain or question youths on school property shall first contact the school principal or his/her designee. To the degree possible, MPs/police officers shall explain the nature of their business and the need to meet with the youth(s) in question. Parents/guardians should be contacted prior to

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interviewing/interrogating juveniles. See section 9000 for information concerning the interview and interrogation of juvenile offenders.

b. Generally, students should not be publicly contacted by MPs/police officers in the school setting for purposes of questioning, unless a detention is anticipated or reasonably possible. Youths should be summoned by school officials to a private interview room or other appropriate area for purposes of questioning.

c. School officials may be present as observers during interviews or questioning of students if requested.

d. MPs/police officers shall not enlist school officials or employees to conduct interviews, inquiries, or similar fact-finding activities regarding students as part of an investigation.

e. School officials who act at the direction of or on behalf of the interests of the MPs/police constructively become police officers, and, in so doing, must abide by the legal provisions pertaining to MPs/police officers.

f. MPs/police officers are not precluded from questioning school officials regarding their knowledge of students and student activities.

### 3. Detention/Removal of Students from School

a. Students shall not be removed from school property without notifying the school principal or his/her designee. MPs/police officers are also responsible for ensuring that the youth's parent(s), guardian(s), or a responsible adult is notified of the youth's removal, irrespective of school officials making such notification.

b. MPs/police officers should notify the principal or his/her designee before making a detention of a student during school hours on school property unless exigent circumstances exist or such notification would potentially jeopardize the ability of MPs/police officers to safely and effectively make the detention.

c. MPs/police officers should avoid making detentions on school grounds when the detention may be made effectively elsewhere.

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d. When possible, MPs/police officers should not detain juveniles on school grounds if the use of force is a reasonable possibility.

e. MPs/police officers should use handcuffs or other restraining devices when making detentions in schools whenever deemed necessary to ensure the security of juvenile detainees and the safety of the MPs/police officers and others.

f. Detaining students on school property should, to the degree possible, be conducted so as to minimize embarrassment to the student and disruption of school activities.

4. Searches in Schools. Well publicized incidents in recent years have indicated a need to maintain safety and security in our schools. Though Department of Defense Dependent Schools are government entities and operate on government property, evolving case law in many locations limit what MPs/police officers may do, absent exigent circumstances, in the way of searching and seizing evidence in a school setting. Also, on some Marine Corps installations, schools are operated by the state or county. Consultation with the staff judge advocate and concerned stake holders (school administrators, principals, and teachers) in the school system must be conducted before planned police operation in schools. The below procedures should be used in supporting searches in schools:

a. Police searches of students and their property (bags, clothing, purses, assigned school lockers, etc.) on school premises are generally subject to the same legal requirements for probable cause and a search warrant/authorization as other searches. Exceptions to the search warrant requirement (for example, consent to search and emergency situations) that apply to non-school searches also apply to school searches.

b. School employees may conduct searches of specific students and their property (bags, clothing, purses, assigned school lockers, etc.) without a warrant/authorization, based on reasonable suspicion. The reasonable suspicion must be by individual and not a group. School employees may also conduct scheduled inspections/searches of assigned school lockers for items such as trash, school property and library books. While students have no expectation of privacy in their assigned school lockers because the lockers belong to the school, they do have such an expectation for their personal possessions stored in the school lockers, such as book bags and jackets. The following guidelines apply to school searches for stolen property:

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(1) When school employees want to find property (property of relatively minor value, at least, such as tennis shoes), it is possible to search more than one student so long as employees have enough suspicion to justify each search.

(2) Employees should ask students for voluntary consent to be searched.

(3) Before forcing any searches, employees should investigate to determine whether individualized suspicion exists for the students who did not consent to a search. For example, employees can ask these students where they were at relevant times, they can ask other students whether they observed the students in question, and they can observe how the non-consenting students react to questioning. Unless school employees have reason to suspect individual students who do not consent to a search, they cannot search those students.

(4) School employees cannot first search the consenting students and then declare, if those consensual searches reveal no stolen property, that they have individualized suspicion of the students who did not consent to a search. A nonconsensual search must be justified at its inception, when school employees first decide to search.

c. MPs/police officers should not accompany school employees who are conducting a search without a search warrant.

11500 - Navy/Marine Corps Courthouse Security Procedures

11501. Purpose. This section establishes PMO/MCPD procedures concerning Navy/Marine Corps courthouse security.

11502. Policy

1. Courthouse security measures should address deterrence, detection, and limitation of risk. Most importantly, courthouse security measures should focus on removing opportunities for violence, especially violence with a weapon. The installation SJA is responsible for courthouse security.

2. PMs/CPs provide support for installation SJAs. PMOs/MCPDs may be requested to provide both emergency response and subject matter expertise for courthouse security, in addition to being familiar with normal procedures when MPs/police officers attend court to testify.

11503. Definitions

1. Courthouse is defined as the combined internal space housing courtrooms; judicial, witness, member and spectator spaces; trial and defense counsel spaces; and the external areas, such as parking lots, that support military justice proceedings.

11504. Procedures

1. PMs/CPs shall work with installation SJAs and judges to establish emergency response procedures for courthouses, provide subject matter expertise/support, and ensure MPs/police officers follow courthouse procedures.

2. Physical Security Branches will assist installation SJAs in establishing/maintaining courthouse security.

3. MPs/police officers shall:

a. Respond to emergency incidents in courthouses based on the nature of the incident and locally established procedures.

b. Follow courthouse procedures when testifying.  
Introduction of firearms within the courtroom, other than for evidentiary purposes, is not advisable but shall be subject to the discretion of the presiding military judge or installation SJA consistent with reference (a).

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4. The convening authority is responsible for the transport and custody of pretrial confinees and convicted personnel at all times.

5. Comprehensive, annual courthouse threat assessments should be conducted by the installation SJA. PMs/CPs may be requested to provide subject matter expertise.

6. Courthouse Security Measures

a. Surveillance systems should be used to monitor ingress/egress points, and sensitive internal/external areas that are not easily observed by courthouse staff.

b. Parking. Reserved parking spaces for judges and court members should be identified as reserved, but not for a particular billet and/or rank. Parking should be adequately lighted and consideration should be given to surveillance with cameras.

c. Duress alarms should be considered for the ingress/egress points, judges' benches and chambers, and should annunciate at PMO/MCPD and throughout the courthouse facility.

d. Lockable firearm safes shall be available for storage of police weapons if firearms are not allowed in the courtroom, and will be located so as to provide constant supervision when being used.

e. Access control systems should be installed within the courthouse to limit access to sensitive areas such as judicial chambers, trial and defense counsel spaces, and other locations, as appropriate.

f. Drills should be conducted periodically with courthouse personnel and PMO/MCPD to test and evaluate emergency response procedures.

g. During days and evenings of judicial proceedings, all participants and spectators entering a courthouse (except the military judge, counsel, court members, MPs/police officers serving in their official capacity) should enter through a single ingress/egress point and pass through a metal detector, if available.

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## Section 11600 - Customs

11601. Purpose. This section establishes PMO/MCPD guidelines for conducting military customs programs.

11602. Policy

1. It is DOD policy to assist and cooperate with U.S. and foreign HN border clearance agencies in halting the flow of contraband both into the U.S. and foreign countries. The DOD will enforce this when entry is through military channels and will cooperate with other federal agencies when enforcing U.S. laws and regulations and complying with foreign requirements concerning customs, agriculture, immigration, and other border clearance requirements without unnecessarily delaying the movement of DOD personnel and material. This also applies to the export of goods to and through other countries. The DOD policy is to eliminate the flow of contraband and unacceptable products to other nations. The DOD acknowledges the primacy of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) over cargo and personnel moving into the Customs Territory of the U.S. (CTUS) and that their officers or inspectors may delay, impound, or otherwise prohibit the entry or export of military cargo into or from the CTUS, without obstruction by the DOD, the Services, or the Defense Agencies.

2. Pre-Clearance Programs. The border clearance requirements in reference (am) apply to all international movement of DOD cargo and personnel at the time they cross the border. Under certain circumstances (e.g., major unit rotations and redeployments in conjunction with exercises and contingency operations) cargo and personnel returning to the U.S. can be "pre-cleared" (e.g., inspected/certified at the origin instead of at the US border). When deemed to be beneficial to the DOD and/or CBP and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), pre-clearance programs may be established. These pre-clearance programs will be initiated only when the Theater Command, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and the respective U.S. Agency or Agencies explicitly agree to their establishment. Procedures for requesting the establishment of a pre-clearance program are detailed in Chapter 506 of reference (am).

11603. Procedures

1. PMs/CPs shall:



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a. Establish and conduct a military customs program as directed and per reference (am).

b. Appoint, provide training for and obtain proper certification for Military Customs Inspectors-Excepted (MCI-E) and Customs Boarder Clearance Agents (CBCAs) per reference (am) and Geographic Combatant Command regulations.

2. Military Customs Inspectors shall:

a. Perform duties per reference (am) and U.S. and/or foreign country border clearance requirements.

b. Inspect or examine baggage, professional equipment and cargo as authorized in established memorandums of understanding and designated on his/her CF 55, Designation, Customs Officer-Excepted. All passengers and crewmembers are subject to inspection. The degree to which accompanied baggage or equipment is inspected or examined is dependent upon the discretion and judgment of the MCI-Es. "Dumping" of baggage contents is against both DOD and CBP policy and is prohibited.

c. Accomplish inspections in a courteous and professional manner.

d. Only inspect active duty military personnel. All civilian personnel will be inspected by a CBP officer.

e. Immediately report contraband discoveries (for example, drugs, firearms and/or explosives) to the closest CBP Port Director and the installation commander.

3. CBCAs shall:

a. Perform duties per reference (am) and U.S. and/or foreign country border clearance requirements.

b. Inspect and certify that DOD-owned materiel, personal property, and passengers are acceptable for entry into the U.S. If contraband is discovered during the inspection process, notify legal authorities.

c. Represent the commander in performance of inspections and ensure that the documentation accompanies all shipments or personnel.

d. Ensure that customs/border clearance violations are expeditiously reported to the proper legal authority or military agency for disposition.

e. Conduct all inspections and examinations in a professional, expeditious, and courteous manner.

f. Do not, under any circumstances, collect or accept duty payments.

Section 11700 - Maritime and Waterside Security

11701. Purpose. This section provides guidance for maritime and waterside security operations aboard Marine Corps installations.

11702. Policy

1. Maritime and waterside security present unique and challenging tasks to installation commanders. No two Marine Corps installations are the same with respect to ocean and water frontage areas. Maritime and waterside security requirements must be addressed in the installation physical security plan. There are mechanisms available to assist commanders in establishing control of installation waterside/waterfront perimeters thereby limiting personnel, vehicle, and vessel access to areas under their control.

2. Some installations may have naval defensive sea areas (NDSA).

3. Establishing Limited Waterways. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) are the implementing authority(s) for establishing control, access to, and movement within certain areas of their jurisdiction, as it pertains to waterways and waterfront property. Access control and movement within certain areas may be restricted in the interest of safety, security, or when other national interests dictate.

a. The USACE local field office is the responsible agency for establishing restricted areas. The Coast Guard Captain of the Port is responsible for establishing all other types of limited waterway areas. Requests for controls and/or designation of a limited waterway require that commanders provide a written application with supporting documents to the responsible agency. Supporting documents include complete justification regarding the type of designation requested and a detail map of the affected area(s). The establishment of any limited waterway requires public notification and hearings in order to identify any affects or concerns with regards to the local populace.

b. Commanders must coordinate designation and protection of the waterways with the respective agency. Operations and/or security plans will fully identify areas of responsibility and jurisdiction. Liaison between PMO/MPCD, security personnel and

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the respective agency must be continuous in order to ensure that the conditions for the designation and all procedural requirements remain valid and current.

4. Waterside Assets. The following assets are common at installations with waterside/ waterfront property(s):

- a. Passenger and cargo vessels.
- b. Pleasure craft and pleasure craft piers.
- c. Pier/port complex.
- d. Military support vessels.
- e. Waterfront facilities.
- f. Warships.
- g. Passenger ships and terminals.
- h. Navigational aids.
- i. Distinguished visitors/very important people (DVs/VIPs) aboard ship or at waterfront facilities.
- j. Military piers.
- k. Shore facilities connectors; causeways, tunnels, cables utility towers, and bridges and facilities where unauthorized access may be gained or an approach made from the waterside.

5. The PMO/MCPD maritime and waterside security mission is to provide maritime/waterside security for the installation, enforce applicable laws and regulations and to assist the state Department of Public Safety (DPS), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Enforcement Division, and U.S. Coast Guard personnel, when appropriate, in the enforcement of assimilated state and federal laws.

#### 11703. Procedures

1. PMs/CPs, as the staff officer responsible for installation physical security, shall request establishment of limited waterways when required.

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2. Waterborne Threats. PMs/CPs must consider a number of waterborne threats such as mines, swimmers, small boats with armed personnel, and small boats laden with explosives. Targets include ships, shore facilities, wharfs, and piers.

3. Physical Security Measures. PMs/CPs must address waterside facility and asset security by erecting perimeters and outfitting them to identify attempted or successful penetrations. This includes the full complement of physical security measures, including instructions, barriers, security systems, establishment of enforcement zones, and response capabilities to combat waterborne threats.

a. Enforcement Zones: Enforcement zones must be established to implement and sustain waterside security and serve as an action position for security forces:

(1) A security zone is the area from the average high water mark to a point at the range of anticipated waterborne threats. Security forces notify vessels, crafts, and swimmers that they are entering restricted waters and must alter their course. Security forces may stop and search vessels if necessary, although as a general rule, engagements are not a high priority. Security zones usually extend to the furthest point allowed by USACE and USCG requirements.

(2) A reaction zone is the area from the high water mark to a distance beyond the maximum range of anticipated waterborne threats. Security forces stop and challenge intruders, taking action to stop potential threats.

(3) A keep out zone is the area closest to protected assets and is located from the asset to the maximum range of anticipated threat weapons (hundreds of yards for small arms and rocket propelled grenades to several thousand yards for man portable anti-tank weapons). Security forces must prevent entry of hostile craft or vessels into this zone; local defenses may be engaged if hostile craft or vessels enter this zone.

b. Boundary Markers. Several devices can be used to establish boundaries separating the installation or asset from surrounding or bordering waters. Boundaries can provide areas of operation for waterborne security patrols, Special Reaction Team patrols, and contact and escort (C&E) services. Among the devices that can be used to establish and mark boundaries are:

(1) Buoys or floats.